Escaping The ICWA Penalty Box: In Defense of Equal Protection for Indian Children by Sandefur, Timothy
Children's Legal Rights Journal 
Volume 37 Issue 1 Article 2 
2017 
Escaping The ICWA Penalty Box: In Defense of Equal Protection 
for Indian Children 
Timothy Sandefur 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Timothy Sandefur, Escaping The ICWA Penalty Box: In Defense of Equal Protection for Indian Children, 37 
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1 (2020). 
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol37/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Children's Legal Rights Journal by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact 
law-library@luc.edu. 
Escaping The ICWA Penalty Box:
In Defense of Equal Protection for Indian Children
By Timothy Sandefur*
"And finally this, when the sun was falling down so beautiful we didn't have time to give it a
name, she held the child born ofwhite mother and red father and said, 'Both sides of this baby
are beautiful.
Sherman Alexie
INTRODUCTION
In early 2016, a six-year-old Californian child named "Lexi" was taken from the arms of
her weeping foster parents, Rusty and Summer Page, 2 and sent to live with her step-second-
cousin in Utah instead. She had lived with the Pages for four of her six years of life, after Los
Angeles child welfare officials removed her from her drug-addicted mother and incarcerated
father.3 She was strongly bonded to the Pages, called them "mommy" and "daddy," and
regarded the Pages' other children as her siblings.4 Nobody alleged that the Pages had mistreated
Lexi. She had found love and stability in their home. Had this been an ordinary case, they
would almost certainly have adopted her, as they wanted to do.
* Vice President for Litigation and holder of the Clarence J. & Katherine P. Duncan Chair in Constitutional
Government, Goldwater Institute. J.D. 2002, Chapman University School of Law; B.A. 1998, Hillsdale College.
This article depends heavily on extensive research performed by Adi Dynar, Clint Bolick, and Mark Flatten.
I SHERMAN ALEXIE, THE LONE RANGER AND TONTO FISTFIGHT IN HEAVEN 148 (2d ed. 2013).
2 See, e.g., Charlotte Alter, Inside the Agonizing Custody Fight Over Six-Year-Old Lexi, TIME (Mar. 27, 2016),
http://time.com/4269542/inside-the-agonizing-custody-fight-over-lexi-page/.
' Brenda Gazzar, Santa Clarita Family Won't Give up on Lexi Despite Legal Setback, L.A. DAILY NEWS (July 12,
2016), http://www.dailynews.com/social-affairs/20160712/santa-clarita-foster-family-wont-give-up-on-lexi-despite-
legal-setback; Lindsey Bever, "Keep Lexi Home": A Foster Family's Wrenching Fight for A 6-Year-Old Choctaw
Girl, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/03/24/keep-lexi-
home-a-foster-familys-wrenching-fight-for-a-6-year-old-choctaw-girl/.
4 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, R.P. & S.P. v. L.A. Dep 't of Child. & Fam. Svcs., et al., (No. 16-500).
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But Lexi was not like other children. Her great, great, great, great-grandparent was a
full-blooded Choctaw Indian.5 That meant that foster-care and adoption proceedings in her case
were governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). 6 ICWA defines "Indian
children" as tribal "resources," 7 and gives tribal governments extraordinary power to control the
fate of abused, neglected, or abandoned Indian children. It mandates that Indian children in
foster care or eligible for adoption be placed with other Indians or with families chosen by tribal
governments. These and other provisions of ICWA override the "best interests of the child"
standard that applies to all other children. Indeed, guidelines recently promulgated by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) make the point clear: for courts to engage in "an independent
consideration of the best interest of the Indian child" is improper, according to the BIA, "because
the [dictated] preferences reflect the best interests of an Indian child in light of the purposes of
the Act." 8
5 The Choctaw Constitution accords citizenship to the "lineal descendants" of "all Choctaw Indians by blood whose
names appear on the final rolls of the Choctaw Nation" approved in 1906. CHOCTAW CONST. art. II, § 1.
6 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012).
7 Id. § 1901(2), (3).
Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 80 Fed. Reg. 10146, 10158
F.4(c)(3) (Feb. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Guidelines]. See also In re C.H., 997 P.2d 776, 782 (Mont. 2000) ("while the
best interests of the child is an appropriate and significant factor in custody cases under state law, it is improper" in
ICWA cases because "ICWA expresses the presumption that it is in an Indian child's best interests to be placed in
conformance with the preferences."). The BIA recently published new final ICWA regulations. Indian Welfare Act
Proceedings, 25 C.F.R. § 23 (2016). These regulations include no explicit reference to the best interests standard,
and do not specify what constitutes "good cause" for deviating from ICWA, although they do provide that a good
cause finding "should" be based on factors such as the wishes of the parents, the unavailability of a suitable ICWA-
compliant placement, and the "extraordinary" needs of the child-but not "ordinary bonding or attachment that
flowed from time spent in a non-preferred placement that was made in violation of ICWA." Id. §23.132(e)(c)(3).
They do forbid courts from considering various factors in the good cause determination, however, including whether
the foster-care proceeding is at an advanced stage, or the "negative perception of Tribal . . . social services or
judicial systems." Id. §23.118(c)(1), (5). The comments accompanying the regulations definitively reject "a free-
ranging 'best interests' determination," 81 Fed. Reg. 38777, 38847 (June 14, 2016), and emphasize that "[t]he final
rule does not include a 'best interests' consideration." Id. at 38827.
2 [Vol. 37:12017]
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ICWA was originally designed to prevent the breakup of Indian families and to protect
children and parents from abusive state government officials. 9 Laudable goals, to be sure. But
in practice, ICWA often harms children, by delaying or denying them placement in stable and
loving homes, compelling their reunification with abusive birth parents, and mandating
procedures that deprive them of the legal protections they need. 10 In the most extreme cases,
such as Lexi's, children who lack any cultural or political affiliation with a tribe, and do not live
on a reservation, are subject to ICWA's burdens solely because their ethnic ancestry renders
them "eligible" for tribal membership." As the Supreme Court recently observed in Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl-one of only two Supreme Court decisions addressing ICWA-the Act's
mandates can "override . . . the child's best interests" and dissuade willing and caring families
from adopting Indian children-thereby imposing on these children "a unique disadvantage in
finding . . . permanent and loving home[s]," and burdening their futures "solely because an
ancestor-even a remote one-was an Indian." 12
How is it possible that more than half a century after Brown v. Board ofEducation,13 the
United States government still maintains a dejure "separate but equal"-or, more precisely,
separate and substandard-legal system for one particular racial group? What does it say about
the basic principles of our Constitution vis-a-vis our Native American population? And how can
9 See generally Matthew L. M. Fletcher & Wenona T. Singel, Indian Children and the Federal-Tribal Trust
Relationship (Apr. 28, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2772139.
1o See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of The Tribe: The Indian Child Welfare Act and The
Adoption ofIndian Children, 66 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 451, 453 (1989) ("For non-Indians who wish to adopt an
Indian child, the risks are often considerably greater than in adoptions of other children .... For the Indian children
who may become involved in protracted controversies about their adoptive placement, the ICWA goal of promoting
their best interests may be undermined by the ICWA's other goal of ensuring tribal survival."). See also Elizabeth
Stuart, Native American Foster Children Suffer Under a Law Originally Mean to Help Them, PHOENIX NEW TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/native-american-foster-children-suffer-under-a-law-
originally-meant-to-help-them-8621832.
" 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012).
12 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564-65 (2013).
13 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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this be fixed in a way that respects the legitimate interests of Indian citizens while protecting the
most vulnerable Americans?
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the origin and structure of ICWA. Part
II focuses on six provisions of the Act that place Indian children in what we term "the ICWA
Penalty Box," depriving them of critical legal protections. Part III addresses the question of
whether ICWA's differential treatment of Indian children qualifies as unconstitutional racial
discrimination, and the "Existing Indian Family Doctrine"-a legal theory that state courts
developed in an effort to avoid the equal protection problems that arise from an undiluted
application of ICWA's literal language. 14 Because this article focuses primarily on cases
involving children who are not domiciled on reservations, and have no cultural connection to
tribes-but who are eligible for membership solely on account of their ancestry-not every
argument presented here will necessarily be relevant to all ICWA proceedings. But Part IV does
address a basic question of constitutional principle that applies to all cases: is equal treatment
before the law appropriate for Indian children?
The answer to that question is yes. But before beginning, a disclaimer is warranted.
American Indian law is fraught with a bloody, tragic, often plainly disgusting history of racism,
violence, and even genocide. That history-which played a prominent role in ICWA's
origin s-must not and cannot be ignored or treated euphemistically. This article is written in
full recognition of the deplorable legacy of abuse and betrayal, mutual incomprehension and
prejudice, which has plagued relations between Indians and non-Indians in North America. It is
tragic that these problems persist to this day-and that ICWA is partly to blame.
14 See infra Part III.
15 For an especially thorough and powerful explanation of the history of abuse that led to the adoption of ICWA, see
Fletcher & Singel, supra note 9.
4 [Vol. 37:12017]
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One common theme of this shameful history is that Indians have often suffered from
undertakings that were advertised at the time as "helping." 16 The infamous boarding school
system, with its policy of "kill the Indian to save the man," 17 or the self-serving myth that
Indians had no concept of private property rights-which functioned as a handy excuse to
deprive them of their homelands-are obvious examples.1 8 In these and other ways, Indians
have frequently been betrayed under promises that the government would "benefit" and "protect"
them.
So, too, with ICWA. Though enacted with good intentions, the provisions of ICWA
critiqued below harm Indian children, deprive them of the protection of the "best interests of the
child" standard, move them beyond the reach of state protective services, curtail their rights to
due process and equal protection, subordinate their interests to those of tribal governments, and
cripple efforts to rescue them from abuse and find them stable homes. The "ICWA Penalty Box"
obstructs the ability of American Indian children to realize the benefits of their American
citizenship.
This last point is worth emphasizing. All Indian children are citizens of the United
States 19 and entitled to the equal protection of the laws. That they are denied such protection
today is a disgrace. However noble the intentions behind ICWA's passage, it is today often a
cause of abuse. All children, regardless of their ancestry, deserve to be regarded as individuals,
16 See generally NAOMI SCHAEFER RILEY, THE NEW TRAIL OF TEARS: How WASHINGTON IS DESTROYING
AMERICAN INDIANS (2016) (describing how paternalistic policies such as the "trust" relationship-that bars private
ownership of land on reservations-BIA regulations on businesses on reservations-which make it harder to engage
in trades-and other allegedly helpful policies harm Native Americans).
17 See generally Ann Piccard, Death by Boarding School: The "Last Acceptable Racism" And the United States'
Genocide ofNative Americans, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 137, 140 (2014).
s See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATIONS? INDIAN ECONOMIES: AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS (1995); TOM FLANAGAN ET AL., BEYOND THE INDIAN ACT: RESTORING
ABORIGINAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2010); Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will
Capitalism or Socialism Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 764-80 (2001).
19 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012).
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and their best interests should be the overriding consideration in cases involving their welfare.
The United States owes American Indian children nothing less.
I.
ICWA'S BACKGROUND
"We never have objected to become citizens of the United States and to conform to her laws; but
in the event of conforming to her laws, we have required the protection and the privileges of her
laws to accompany that conformity on our part."
-John Ross 20
A. The History of ICWA
To understand ICWA, one must keep in mind the precarious, often inconsistent, legal
regime that governs American Indians. Federal Indian policy has wavered between efforts to
eradicate tribal power and to strengthen it. These conflicting goals have left the field of Indian
law strewn with confusion, contradiction, and sometimes cynicism.
In 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act21 announced a retreat from the federal
government's previous policy of seeking to eradicate tribes. 22 Yet in the 1950s, Congress again
moved toward ending tribal authority, and under the banner of "termination," passed laws that
aimed to close the tribes down, and to extend state criminal jurisdiction over reservation lands. 23
Then the federal government reversed course again.24 The Civil Rights era led to the formation
2 0 JOHN Ross, LETTER FROM JOHN Ross, PRINCIPAL CHIEF OF THE CHEROKEE NATION OF INDIANS IN ANSWER TO
INQUIRIES FROM A FRIEND REGARDING THE CHEROKEE AFFAIRS WITH THE UNITED STATES 12 (1836).
21 Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 5101 (2012)).
2 2 See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 60-63 (2005) (Although
the Act imposed "a top-down, paternalistic approach" on tribes, it ended the "allotment" policy that sought to divide
and sell reservation land and created a framework for tribes to establish formal governments).
23 These included House Concurrent Resolution 108 (H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953)); Pub. Law
280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360); and the Indian Relocation Act of
1956, Pub. L. No. 84-959, 70 Stat. 986. The record, however, is not unmixed. Although not often mentioned, the
termination policy was enacted alongside other laws that also sought to end the policy of paternalism that deprived
Indians of much of their freedom. Thus, Public Law 281, 67 Stat. 590, repealed prohibitions on Indians buying and
selling various goods, including farming tools, guns, and clothes, and Public Law 277, 67 Stat. 586, allowed tribes to
decide for themselves whether to allow or prohibit alcohol on reservations.
24 WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 77-78.
6 [Vol. 37:12017]
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of the American Indian Policy Review Commission, which in 1977 issued a report calling for
significant changes to federal Indian policy.25 Among the fruits of this renewed commitment to
self-government were the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,26
federal regulations governing recognition of tribes, 27 and Supreme Court decisions that
recognized, but limited, tribal sovereignty. 28 Among the capstones of this era was ICWA.
ICWA was enacted in response to efforts during the termination era to assimilate Indian
children into American society. At that time, federal policy consciously sought to separate
Indian children from their parents 29 and to place them in boarding schools, where many children
were abused and were punished for speaking Indian languages or practicing traditional
religions. 30 Children were also removed from Indian families under local standards that failed to
account for traditional Indian cultural practices, and were adopted by non-Indian families, with a
view to assimilating Indians into white society and terminating the existence of tribes.31
25 Id.
26 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1975) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 5301 (2016)).
27 See generally 25 C.F.R. § 83.28 See N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 16-34 (2008).
29 Randall Kennedy provides a powerful critique of the allegations of abuse that led to the passage of ICWA.
RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 484-99 (2003). On the
other hand, as Kennedy acknowledges, hard evidence on such subjects is difficult to come by. Id. at 489-502. As
recently as March, 2015, a federal district court in South Dakota found that local child welfare officers were failing
to comply with ICWA and were engaging in abusive practices that "failed to protect Indian parents' fundamental
rights to a fair hearing." Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 772 (D.S.D. 2015).
30 Until enactment of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012), in 1978, various
federal directives essentially outlawed many native religious practices. This was often done not by statute but by
executive order. See generally JACQUELINE SHEA MURPHY, THE PEOPLE HAVE NEVER STOPPED DANCING: NATIVE
AMERICAN MODERN DANCE HISTORIES (2007). This is just one of the many examples of the way Indians have often
suffered because they have been governed not by law but by administrative decree. In her classic Origins of
Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt explored the ways nineteenth century administrative rule served as a precursor to
totalitarian government. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM, 123-304 (1976).
Administrative rule "has conspicuous advantages for the domination of far-flung territories with heterogeneous
populations, and for a policy of oppression," wrote Arendt. "It can easily overcome the variety of local customs and
need not rely on the necessarily slow process of development of general law." Id. at 244. Such rule, Arendt argues,
encourages lawlessness generally and destabilizes the political culture in such a way as to hinder the growth of
freedom.
31 See generally Fletcher & Singel, supra note 9.
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In passing ICWA, Congress sought to preserve and strengthen Indian families and tribes
by preempting state child welfare laws that led to family breakup. Among other things, it gives
tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over child custody cases involving tribal members on
reservations,32 orders state and federal courts to give full faith and credit to the child custody
decisions of tribal courts, 33 requires notification of parents and tribes regarding involuntary
proceedings such as the severance of parental rights,34 mandates procedures to ensure that tribal
members know their rights when asked to sign papers to terminate a parent-child relationship, 35
and employs the "prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community" in child
welfare cases. 36
Had ICWA stopped there, it would hardly be controversial. But it goes further-and falls
short-in many other ways.
B. ICWA's Basic Presumptions: The Rights of Parents, Tribes, and Children
The problems begin with the definition of an "Indian child." Congress, understandably
reluctant to interfere with the authority of tribes to determine their own membership, deferred
wholesale to tribal authorities on the question of who does and does not qualify as Indian for
purposes of ICWA. The Act defines an "Indian child" as any child who is a member of a tribe,
32 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012). Divorce proceedings do not, however, qualify as child custody proceedings under
ICWA. Id. § 1903(1).
33 Id. § 1911(d). It does not, however, require tribal courts to accord full faith and credit to state proceedings. See
generally B. J. Jones, Tribal Considerations in Comity and Full Faith and Credit Issues, 68 N.D. L. REV. 689 (1992)
(while state courts are often obligated to give full faith and credit to tribal court judgments, tribal courts are not
required to do the same to state court decisions). As Ivy N. Voss observes, "Tribal courts are not subject to
provisions of the ICWA, presumably because they are expected to act in harmony with Indian priorities." In the
Best Interest: The Adoption ofF.H., an Indian Child, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 151, 164 (1993).
34 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012).
3 51 Id. § 1913(a).
3 6 1d. § 1915(d).
8 [Vol. 37:12017]
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or who is eligible for membership and is the biological child of a tribal member.37 Meanwhile,
virtually all Indian tribes define eligibility for membership in terms of ethnic heritage or
ancestry. 38 Federal regulations impose no minimum blood quantum.39 This means that tribal
determinations as to whether a child is Indian are determinative-and a child can qualify as an
Indian child for purposes of ICWA based on one drop of Indian blood.
The Cherokee Constitution, for example, defines eligibility solely based on whether a
person has a direct ancestor on the Dawes Rolls.40 Other tribes define membership by blood
quantum. Under Navajo law, for instance, a person is eligible for membership if he or she "is at
least one-fourth degree Navajo blood." 4 1 Still other tribes require blood quantum, but not tribal
affiliation. Thus, the Gila River Indian Community entitles "[a]ll children of members ... [who]
are of at least one-fourth Indian blood" to membership. 42 This means that a child who is, say, the
child of a tribal member, but who has only one percent Gila River ancestry, and twenty-four
percent Navajo ancestry, is eligible for membership in the Gila River Indian Community (but
3 7 Id. § 1903(4).
38 See generally Kirsty Gover, Genealogy As Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent
Rules in Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243 (2009).
39 Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10153, B.3(c)(1).
40 CHEROKEE CONST. art. IV § 1. The Dawes Rolls, or Final Rolls of Citizens and Freemen of the Five Civilized
Tribes, was an attempted census of tribal membership overseen by the Dawes Commission in 1898. The rolls were
closed in 1907, although some names were added in 1914. The rolls are problematic evidence of Indian ancestry for
several reasons. First, many Indians refused to sign the rolls. ERIK M. ZISSU, BLOOD MATTERS: THE FIVE
CIVILIZED TRIBES AND THE SEARCH FOR UNITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 26 (2001). Thus, even full-blooded
Cherokee are today ineligible for tribal membership if a direct ancestor did not sign. Also, the Dawes Commission
mandated that Indians identify with a single tribe when signing, even though tribal membership and ancestry often
overlapped. As a result, non-Indian enrollment agents often arbitrarily assigned enrollees to one tribe or another.
See generally S. Alan Ray, A Race or A Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status ofFreedmen's
Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387 (2007) (discussing how the Dawes era's "reliance on nineteenth-century
race science" distorted tribal consciousness and channeled it into a racial or biological construct). The Cherokee
National Citizenship Act purports to make all eligible children automatic members of the tribe for a period of 240
days after birth in order to expand tribal authority under ICWA. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected
"this sort of gamesmanship on the part of a tribe." Nielson v. Ketchum, 640 F.3d 1117, 1124 (10th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S.Ct. 2429 (2012).
41 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. i, § 701(B) (2016).
42 GILA RIVER INDIAN COMM. CONST. art. III § 1(b) (emphasis added).
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would not be eligible for Navajo citizenship) and is subject to ICWA.43 It also means that a child
who is fully connected to a tribe's culture-say, the adopted child of a tribal member-is not
subject to ICWA, while a child whose connection to a tribe is only genetic is, even if that child
has no cultural or social ties to the tribe.
Once a child qualifies as "an Indian child" under ICWA, the tribe's authority with regard
to that child is in many ways elevated to a parity with the rights of the parents.44 Even if the
parents wish to block application of ICWA, they are often unable to do so, and tribes can even
override their expressed wishes.45 In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, Indian
parents chose to leave the reservation before giving birth, and signed voluntary consent forms
agreeing to have their child adopted by a non-Indian couple. 46 Nevertheless, the tribe
successfully moved to have the adoption order vacated for non-compliance with ICWA.47 The
Supreme Court concluded that ICWA "was not meant to be defeated by the actions of individual
members," because the statute protects "not solely . . . Indian children and families, but also ...
tribes themselves." 48
43 Id. Even Cherokee whose ancestors did sign might be denied membership. Consider the ongoing controversy
over the status of the "Cherokee Freedmen"-descendants of slaves owned by the Cherokee prior to the Civil War.
Ray, supra note 40, at 437-46; Jeremiah Chin, Red Law, White Supremacy: Cherokee Freedmen, Tribal
Sovereignty, and the Colonial Feedback Loop, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1227, 1267-68 (2014).
44 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52 (1989).
45 ICWA does allow parents to object when a tribe seeks to transfer jurisdiction over a foster care or termination of
parental rights proceeding to its own courts, in cases involving children not domiciled or residing within the tribe's
reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2012). But parents do not have similar rights in cases involving children
domiciled on a reservation, as in Holyfield. Nor can parents bar a tribe's authority to intervene in a state court
proceeding, or block application of ICWA's adoption or foster care placement preferences, or block other
applications of ICWA. See also In re S.B., 130 Cal. App. 4th 1148, 1159 (2005) (ICWA "serve[s] the interests of the
Indian tribes irrespective of the position of the parents and cannot be waived by the parent." (citations and quotation
marks omitted)).
46 Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37-38.
4 7 1d. at 38
4 81 d. at 49.
10 [Vol. 37:12017]
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In another case, a Cherokee father tried to relinquish his tribal membership in an effort to
block application of ICWA and to "'take the matter out of-out of the Tribe's hands"' and "'help
keep . . . [the child] where she's at."' 49 But the tribe intervened and defeated the father's efforts
to avoid application of ICWA.so In short, ICWA empowers tribal governments in ways that
supersede the judgment of parents when the two come into conflict. As one Indian law expert
puts it, "[t]he purpose of ICWA . . . is ultimately to maintain the survival of the tribe through the
retention of its members."51
The idea of government elevating any third party to "parity" with the rights of parents is
disturbing, and contradicts constitutional protections for parental rights. 52 In Troxel v.
Granville,53 the Supreme Court struck down a Washington State law that forced parents to let
"any person" visit with their children whenever a court determined that this would be "in the best
interest of the child," even if it ran contrary to the parents' preferences. 54 Six justices found that
parental rights, being fundamental rights, could only be infringed for extraordinarily important
reasons, and that the Washington statute overrode those rights on too light a basis.5 5 Worse, the
Court suspected that Washington judges were applying a presumption against parental choices:
"In effect, the judge placed on ... the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation
4 9 In re M.K.T., 368 P.3d 771, 776 (Okla. 2016).
5 0 Id. at 800.
51 Lorinda Mall, Keeping itIn The Family: The Legal and Social Evolution oflCWA in State and Tribal
Jurisprudence, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30 165 (Matthew L. M. Fletcher, et al.,
eds., 2009). This is not entirely accurate. Provisions of ICWA depend not on tribal affiliation, but on Indian
ancestry. Thus, ICWA declares that if extended family or members of the child's tribe are unable to adopt an Indian
child, that child must be placed with "other Indian families," regardless of tribe, instead of non-Indian families. 25
U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2012). Thus, the Act prioritizes Indianness as a racial classification over the survival of the tribe
as a cultural entity.
52 See Philip McCarthy, Jr., The Oncoming Storm: State Indian Child Welfare Act Laws and The Clash of Tribal,
Parental, and Child Rights, 4 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 1027, 1029-35 (2013).
53 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
5 4 Id. at 60.
5 See id. at 66 (plurality); id. at 78-79 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
11
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would be in the best interest of her daughters." 56 Given the fundamental status of parental rights,
the Supreme Court ruled that parents' decisions must be accorded "special weight," over and
above the quotidian "best interests" standard.57
But ICWA goes even further than the Washington visitation statute. It involves not mere
visitation rights, but the far more intrusive matter of tribal jurisdiction to make operative
decisions about child foster care, adoption, and other matters, even where those children are not
domiciled on a reservation and are not members of tribes (but are only eligible for membership).
It allows tribes to block adoption indefinitely while they seek foster and adoptive families of
Native American ancestry, and to obstruct it by mandating that children be placed in accordance
with the preferences laid out in the Act.58 ICWA thus promotes the interests of tribal
governments-non-family members-above the choices of parents, and does so not on the basis
of a "best interests" determination-which, however unclear or "free-ranging" 59 it might have
been in the Troxel case, at least it involved an assessment of a child's unique needs.
For centuries, the best interests of the child standard has been viewed as the essential
lodestar for child welfare litigation. 60 A judge must, in the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
"put himself in the position of a 'wise affectionate and careful parent' and make provision for the
56 Id. at 69 (plurality).
57 Id. at 70 (plurality); See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (parental rights are so important that
it is unconstitutional for the state to authorize termination of those rights on a "preponderance of the evidence"
basis).
5 See infra, section II.D.
59 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76 (Souter, J.).
60 See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE As ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
675-77 (13th ed. 1886) (tracing the origins of the best interests of the child standard to the English parens patriae
doctrine); Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 113, 160-
61 (2009) (The best interest standard has "exist[ed] from time immemorial and has become the bedrock of our state
custody statutory law." It is a "right that is 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127
n.6 (1989)).
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child accordingly." 61 Courts have called the best interests standard the "touchstone" 62 and the
"linchpin" 63 of the law of child welfare. This standard is inherently individualized, meaning that
it focuses on the particular interests of the specific child under his or her unique circumstances. 64
ICWA deprives children whose ancestry is Indian of the protection of that rule and
substitutes a uniform, often insurmountable, presumption that it is in an Indian child's best
interests to have her future determined by tribal authorities. Some courts-and the BIA-have
taken the position that this presumption overrides individualized consideration of the child's
personal best interests, except in the rarest circumstances. 65 And this presumption does not
depend on existing social or cultural links between child and tribe; it depends on biology. BIA
regulations even impose a presumption that ICWA applies when a child is merely suspected of
having Indian ancestry. 66
61 Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433 (1925) (citation omitted). The best interests standard is also the paramount
consideration in much Indian tribal law. See, e.g., Lente v. Notah, 3 Navajo Rptr. 72, 78-80 (1982) (child's best
interest takes precedence over tribal custom).
6 2 In re Marriage of Wellman, 104 Cal. App. 3d 992, 998 (1980).
63 In re Robert L., 21 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 1068 (1993).
64 See In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 845-50 (1992) ("best interests" standard focuses on the child's
individual circumstances); cf In re Adoption of Abel, 931 N.Y.S.2d 829, 834-35 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2011) (children
have a "due process right to an individualized determination of whether this adoption is in [the child's] best
interest"); Dawn D. v. Superior Court (Jerry K.), 17 Cal. 4th 932, 965 (1998) ("a court must make an individualized
determination of the child's best interest in determining the extent, if any, of [a father's] parental rights"); People v.
McCoy, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1578, 1583 (1992) (state law "requires the court to individually assess each child's best
interests in fashioning [custody] orders"). California mandates an individualized best-interest determination by
statute. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (2012).
65 See, e.g., In re C.H., 997 P.2d 776, 782 (Mont. 2000) ("while the best interests of the child is an appropriate and
significant factor in custody cases under state law, it is improper" in ICWA cases because "ICWA expresses the
presumption that it is in an Indian child's best interests to be placed in conformance with the preferences"); In re
Zylena R., 284 Neb. 834, 852 (2012) ("Permitting a state court to deny a motion to transfer [to tribal court] based
upon its perception of the best interests of the child negates the concept of 'presumptively tribal jurisdiction');
contra, In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1353-54 (2014); Navajo Nation v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec.,
230 Ariz. 339, 348 (Ct. App. 2012).
66 25 C.F.R § 23.111(e). The regulations require that ICWA be applied when there is "reason to know" a child is an
"Indian child" under ICWA. But "reason to know" is defined in remarkably loose ways. It occurs when "[a]ny
participant in the proceeding ... informs the court that the child is an Indian child," or if "[a]ny participant ...
informs the court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child," or if "[t]he child ...
gives the court reason to know he or she is an Indian child," among other things. Id. § 23.107(c). While a child may
later prove not to be an Indian child-due to ineligibility for tribal membership, for instance-ICWA's provisions
may have caused substantial delay in the proceedings by the time eligibility is disproven.
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ICWA's presumptions also implicate the rights of parents. The rights of birth parents,
particularly their fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children-are violated when
the government gives a third party rights over the child equal to or greater than their own. 67
ICWA also deprives non-Indian foster and adoptive parents of their right to a legal process that
takes no regard of their race or nationality. Non-Native adults seeking to adopt Indian children
face a far greater burden in court, requiring a greater investment of time and money for legal
representation. They are also more likely to lose their cases for reasons unrelated to their fitness
as adoptive parents-simply because ICWA presumes, as Indian law expert N. Bruce Duthu
expresses it, "that the [Indian] child's best interests are served by maintaining his or her actual or
even potential cultural and social links with his or her Indian tribe." 68
Blanket presumptions of this sort-even if rebuttable-raise significant due process
concerns.69 In Stanley v. Illinois,70 the Supreme Court struck down a state law under which
children of unmarried parents were taken into state custody upon the death of the mother,
without any proof of neglect on the father's part. "It may be . . . that most unmarried fathers are
unsuitable and neglectful parents," the Court noted, "[b]ut all unmarried fathers are not in this
category," and a father should have a genuine opportunity to make his case based on his
individual circumstances. 71 "Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination," declared the Court, but when a legal presumption "forecloses the
determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in
67 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality); In re N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2008) (ICWA
violates substantive due process to the extent that it "makes the rights of a tribe paramount to the rights of an Indian
parent.").
68 DUTHU, supra note 28, at 154-55 (emphasis added).
69 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Abel, 931 N.Y.S.2d 829, 834-35 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2011) (children have a "due process
right to an individualized determination of whether this adoption is in [the child's] best interest").
70 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
7 1 Id. at 654-55.
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deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests
of both parent and child."72
The California Supreme Court likewise warned against using blanket presumptions in In
re Adoption of Kelsey S.,7 3 which involved a group of laws that allowed birth mothers and their
husbands to object to adoptions, but did not allow unmarried fathers to do so. The court found
this irrational, because although the "constitutionally valid objective [was] the protection of the
child's well-being," the state could not simply presume that "a child is inherently better served
by adoptive parents than by a single, biological father."7 4 That crude presumption "bears no
substantial relationship to protecting the well-being of children."7 5 The court gave an example:
"[a] father who is indisputably ready, willing, and able to exercise the full measure of his
parental responsibilities can have his rights terminated merely on a showing that his child's best
interest would be served by adoption," whereas the mother's rights were far more protected, even
if she were "unready, unwilling, and unable" to care for the child.76 The statutory distinction
therefore "largely ignored" the "child's best interest."77
Of course, a presumption in favor of a father can also run afoul of the "best interests
standard." In Dickason v. Sturdavan,78 the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that while a
father may ordinarily be presumed to be the best caretaker of his child (because the "voice of
nature, which declares that the father is the natural guardian of the minor child, cannot be
silenced"), 79 there may be cases in which fathers are unsuitable. Because the child's welfare is
72 Id. at 656-57.
73 1 Cal. 4th 816 (1992).
74 Id. at 845-46.
75 Id. at 847.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 848.
78 50 Ariz. 382 (1937).
79 Id. at 386 (quoting Harper v. Tipple, 21 Ariz 41, 44 (1919)).
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the "paramount consideration," a parent's "prima facie right to . . . custody is not ...
unconditional."so
ICWA's presumptions are at least as powerful as those rejected in Stanley, Kelsey S., and
Dickason. They categorically presume that Indian children are better off in Indian families, or in
families selected by tribal governments, than with non-Indian families. That presumption
compromises, and often forsakes, the welfare of children, by subordinating their interests to
those of tribal collectives. This fact is plain from ICWA's very first words: the Act itself defines
children as "resources" that should be managed to achieve "the continued existence and integrity
of Indian tribes."8 1 But Indian children are not resources. They are persons-citizens of the
United States-and it is improper for government to treat any individual, or group of citizens
defined by their ethnicity, as a means to achieve some third party's ends. 82
Of course, there are cases in which the interests of tribes as corporate institutions conflict
with the interests of children. Where ICWA goes wrong is in its failure, when such conflicts
occur, to unequivocally prioritize the latter. In Holyfield, the Supreme Court quoted the Utah
Supreme Court's rationale for ICWA's equivocation between tribal interests and the interests of
children: "[the] relationship between Indian tribes and Indian children domiciled on the
reservation finds no parallel in other ethnic cultures," it declared. "It is a relationship that many
non-Indians find difficult to understand and that non-Indian courts are slow to recognize." 83 But
80 Id.
s" 25 U.S.C. §1901(3).
82 See, e.g., In re Jasmon 0., 8 Cal.4th 398, 419 (1994) ("Children ... have fundamental rights-including the
fundamental right to . . . 'have a placement that is stable [and] permanent.' Children are not simply chattels ... but
have fundamental interests of their own") (citations omitted); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 249 Neb. 573, 581 (1996)
("Children are not chattels").
83 Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32 (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1986)). Note that the
Holyfield Court confined this romanticized conception to children domiciled on reservations. ICWA goes far
beyond that, and applies off-reservation children as well.
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the Utah court supported that assertion, not by reference to any unique needs of Indian children,
but by reference to the tribal government's interest in exercising its sovereignty. 84 Specifically,
it cited two cases that emphasized the importance of tribal jurisdiction in child custody cases to
the autonomy of tribes: "if tribal sovereignty is to have any meaning at all," it concluded, "it
must necessarily include the right, within its own boundaries and membership, to provide for the
care and upbringing of its young, a sine qua non to the preservation of its identity."85
All of that may be true, but it is also irrelevant to the question of whether Indian children
as individual persons have special needs that justify ICWA's legal presumption that they are
themselves better off in the hands of tribal authorities. It may be the case that the authority to
adjudicate custody disputes on reservations is a sine qua non of tribal sovereignty, but it simply
does not follow that this is in the children's best interests-or that ICWA's means of serving the
interests of tribes is compatible with their due process rights or those of their parents or would-be
adoptive parents. Holyfield simply never addressed that subject.
While the United States has a trust obligation to respect and protect tribal sovereignty, 86 it
does not follow that an American citizen may be legally segregated based on her Indian ancestry,
or may be regarded as a member of a separate legal class based on her national origin, or that she
may be subordinated to the federal government's goal of benefitting another government entity.87
Indeed, such a proposition is fundamentally incompatible with the proposition that all men are
84 See Halloway, 732 P.2d at 969 n.5.
1 Id. (quoting Wisconsin Potawatomies of the Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 730
(W.D. Mich. 1973) (quotation marks omitted)).
86 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
87 Cf Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 16 (1957) ("no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the
Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution," or allow
Congress to "strip[] away" the "shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide ... just
because [the citizen] happens to be in another land.").
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created equal. The preservation of tribes as political and cultural units is simply not adequate
justification for imposing legal presumptions that deprive children of their constitutional rights.
C. ICWA and Social Science
ICWA's powerful presumptions are often defended on the grounds that Indian children
suffer unique psychological damage when they are placed in non-Indian households,8 8 or even
that the feelings of attachment that Indian children experience is qualitatively different from
those that non-Indian children experience. 89 Support for such claims is dubious at best.
For instance, one well-known report entitled Split Feathers argued that Indian children
adopted into non-Indian homes face a higher risk of alcoholism, social disability, and other
psychological problems, and are likely to express feelings of alienation and a loss of identity. 90
Perhaps there are such cases, but Split Feathers cannot withstand scholarly scrutiny. 91 It was
confessedly unscientific, based on only twenty informal interviews of adults, and it drew
untenable causal conclusions based on correlation. 92 For instance, it did not seek to determine
whether the problems it identified might have resulted from abuses the subjects experienced
before they were removed from their birth families, or from the discrimination that Indians may
face in white society, as opposed to the fact of adoption itself.93 It is impossible to know for sure
what role these factors played, because the report indicated no control group, was not peer-
" See, e.g., Catherine M. Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Nebraska: Fifteen Years, A Foundation for the
Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 668 (1994).
89 See, e.g., B.J. Jones, Differing Concepts of "Permanency," in FLETCHER, ET AL., supra note 51, at 131.
90 Carol Locust, Split Feathers: Adult American Indians Who Were Placed in Non-Indian Families as Children, 44
ONTARIO Ass'N OF CHILDREN'S AID Soc. J. 11 (2000), https://splitfeathers.blogspot.com/p/split-feathers-study-by-
carol-locust.html.
91 The shortcomings of the Split Feathers study are detailed in Bonnie Cleaveland, Split Feather: An Untested
Construct (Mar. 2015), http://www.icwa.co/split-feather-scientific-analysis/
9 2 Id.
9 3 Id.
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reviewed, and the author did not disclose her methodology. Other surveys suffer from similar
flaws. 94 More reliable evidence supports the proposition that cross-ethnic adoption is good for
children, or at least does not harm them.95
Even if there were scientific support for the proposition that Indian children are better off
when placed with other Indians, it is doubtful that ICWA properly addresses that problem. For
one thing, neither the Act nor its implementing regulations apply to tribal court proceedings. 96
This means that tribal courts can, and do, approve foster and adoption placements with non-
Indian households. 97 If ICWA is intended to protect Indian children from the allegedly unique
injury of being placed with families of other ethnicities, it would make no sense to allow such
placements simply because tribal courts order them.98 Nor does ICWA apply to divorce
proceedings, even though divorces frequently involve child custody. 99 State courts can therefore
award custody of an Indian child to a non-Indian parent in a divorce proceeding without
94 See KENNEDY, supra note 29, at 499-503 (critiquing other "junk social science" cited by ICWA advocates).
95 See, e.g., DAVID FANSHEL, FAR FROM THE RESERVATION 322 (1972) ("My overall impression is that the children
are doing remarkably well as a group"); RITA J. SIMON & SARAH HERNANDEZ, NATIVE AMERICAN TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTEES TELL THEIR STORIES 13-14 (2008) (non-scientific series of interviews with subjects in which 16 of 20
Indians adopted into non-Indian families reported positive experiences); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black
Children Belong? The Politics ofRace Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1221-24 (1991); See also
Christine D. Bakeis, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Violating Personal Rights for the Sake of the Tribe, 10
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 543, 548-49 (1996) (listing research that shows "that although leaving a
child with his or her natural parents is normally preferable, Indian children can develop normally in non-Indian
homes.").
96 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulations for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings,
25 C.F.R. § 23.103(e) (2015) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23); Michael C. Snyder, An Overview of the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 815, 820 (1995).
97 See Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 38
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 422 (1998) (complaining that tribal courts allow Indian children to remain with non-
Indian adoptive parents, thus "reward[ing] the non-Indian parents" and "mak[ing] bad law.").
98 See also Catherine M. Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Nebraska: Fifteen Years, A Foundation for the
Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 707-08 (1994) ("If the placement parent is willing to learn how to prepare the
child for adult life as a member of a racial minority and to instill in the child a racial identity in which he or she
takes pride, what interest is served by making the child wait for placement in a race matched home? If it is purely
the preservation of the racial culture, the infant or child who has had no connection to that culture is not the best
bearer of that burden.").
99 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
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triggering ICWA-which, again, would be irrational if the Act were aimed at preventing an
alleged psychological harm suffered by Indian children being raised by non-Indians.
Some writers have argued that the psychological needs of Indian children are
qualitatively different from those of non-Indian children. One argues that household stability
and permanency "is a malleable concept," and that Indian children experience permanency "in
[their] tie to the native community and the cultural practices of that community," as opposed to
permanency in a stable, loving home. 100 Thus, placing an Indian child in the custody of a family
of another race "is not the type of 'permanency"' they need. 101
It is doubtful that Indian children inherently have a qualitatively different psychological
experience of permanency than do children with different genes-one that inherently turns on
tribal links. But even if it were true, ICWA does not rationally address such concerns. Its
adoption and foster placement preferences do not depend on culture or tribe, but prioritize the
adoption of Indian children by "other Indian families" 102 even if they are from different tribal
and cultural backgrounds. These preferences can also be invoked to override the wishes of
Native parents, and by non-Indian birth parents to bar adoptions of which tribal member
birthparents approve. 103 And the fact that ICWA does not apply in tribal court means that tribal
judges can, and sometimes do, supersede children's "ties to the native community" and place
those children with non-Indian families. Moreover, even if Indian children do suffer uniquely
when they are placed with adoptive families of non-Indian cultural backgrounds, that cannot
justify applying ICWA to off-reservation children who have no pre-existing cultural connection
100 Jones, Differing Concepts, supra note 92, at 131.
101 Id. at 129.
102 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
103 See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.A.W., 383 P.3d 492, 500-01 (2016) (Non-Indian birth father invoked ICWA to bar
adoption when custodial parent-an Indian mother-remarried and her new husband sought to adopt her child).
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to a tribe. A child like Lexi,104 whose only connection to a tribe is biological, has no tribal
cultural ties to preserve-unless, of course, she is to be regarded as biologically different, and
consequently destined for a segregated legal regime due to her genetics.
A more realistic concern is that Indian children adopted into non-Indian households may
experience discrimination as a consequence of living in a mix-raced household. But this, too, is
not an acceptable foundation for barring trans-racial adoption. In Palmore v. Sidoti, the Supreme
Court ruled that, however strong the effects of social prejudice may be with regard to interracial
adoptions, the government cannot give those prejudices legal effect. 105 In that case, a Florida
court awarded custody of a child to a white father instead of the white mother, because the
mother was living with a black man. 106 To live with an inter-racial couple, the trial court
declared, would not be in the child's best interests because the child would suffer from "peer
pressures" and "social stigmatization." 107 In reversing, the Supreme Court admitted that "[t]here
is a risk that a child living with a step-parent of a different race may be subject to a variety of
pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or
ethnic origin,"o108 but declared that "however real" the effects of prejudice may be, they "cannot
justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother
[who has been] found to be an appropriate person to have such custody." 109 While race can be a
consideration in child custody determinations, under Palmore it may not be the operative
factor. 110
'
04 See infra Part 1I.D.1.
105 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
1 0 6 Id. at 430-31.
107 Id. at 431.
10s Id. at 433.
109 Id. at 434.
"0 See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir.1989); Drunnond v. Fulton City Dep't of Fam. & Child.
Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
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II.
HOW THE ICWA PENALTY BOX WORKS
"[A]ll men must operate under one general law. And while you ask yourselves, what do they, the
Indians, want? you have only to look at the unjust laws made for them, and say they want what I
want, in order to make men of them, good and wholesome citizens."
-William Apess111
Among its many other provisions, ICWA includes six provisions that diverge
significantly from the rules that apply to non-Indian children in foster care and adoption
proceedings. These are: (1) jurisdictional rules that mandate transfer of child welfare cases to
tribal court and give tribes rights as parties to these cases on a par with the rights of parents 112
(2) the "active efforts" requirement that essentially requires child welfare workers to return
children to the custody of unfit birth parents 113 ; (3) the "clear and convincing evidence" standard
applicable in foster care cases 114 ; (4) the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard that states must
apply in termination of parental rights cases1 15 ; (5) race-based foster and pre-adoptive placement
preferences 116; and (6) race-based adoptive placement preferences. 117 Together, these provisions
create "the ICWA penalty box"-a set of legal disadvantages that make it harder to protect
Indian children from abuse, and to find them permanent adoptive homes.1 18
" WILLIAM APESS, A PEQUOT, A SON OF THE FOREST AND OTHER WRITINGS 138 (Barry O'Connell, University of
Massachusetts Amherst Press, 1997) (1836).
112 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), (c).
113 Id. § 1912(d).
114 Id. § 1912(e).
11 5 Id. § 1912(f).
116 Id. § 1915(b).
117 Id. § 1915(a).
". See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2563-64 (2013) (noting that ICWA's mandates can
"unnecessarily place vulnerable Indian children at a unique disadvantage in finding a permanent and loving home");
In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1508 (1996) ("ICWA requires Indian children ... to be treated differently
from non-Indian children . . .. As a result . .. the number and variety of adoptive homes that are potentially
available to an Indian child are more limited than those available to non-Indian children, and an Indian child who
has been placed in an adoptive or potential adoptive home has a greater risk . .. of being taken from that home and
placed with strangers.").
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A. Tribal Jurisdiction and Intervention Powers
ICWA gives tribal governments extensive power over cases involving children who are
not tribal members and are not domiciled on reservations. Specifically, it requires state courts
(in the absence of either parental objection or "good cause" to deviate from ICWA's mandates)
to transfer foster-care and termination-of-parental-rights proceedings to the courts of the child's
tribe, to be determined there.1 19 The 2015 BIA Guidelines apply this rule to all stages of custody
proceedings, including pre-adoption (guardianship) and adoption proceedings. 120 Parents can
block the transfer of foster or termination cases to tribal court, but ICWA also gives tribal
governments power to intervene as parties in such proceedings anywhere in the nation if they
involve Indian children. 121 Also, if a tribe learns after the fact that a state court decided an
adoption matter without tribal involvement, the tribe is entitled to reopen the proceedings and
have them nullified. 122 ICWA's jurisdictional rules, however, violate the requirements of due
process, particularly the "minimum contacts" rule.
1. Due Process and Minimum Contacts
Tribal jurisdiction over children of Indian parents on reservations seems an unremarkable
example of in personam and territorial jurisdiction. 123 Holyfield read this authority broadly, to
119 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). "Good cause" is not defined in ICWA, and dispute over its meaning is among the greatest
sources of controversy over ICWA.
120 Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10153-54, B.6.
121 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
122 Id. § 1914. Cf In re S.L., 2006 WL 477772, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (remanding termination proceeding of 15-
year-old twins on grounds that ICWA notice requirements had not been followed seven years earlier).
123 See Fisher v. Dist. Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Montana, in & for Rosebud Cty., 424 U.S. 382, 387-89
(1976) (per curiam). In this regard, ICWA simply reinforced the Supreme Court's holding that tribal court
determinations of on-reservation child custody proceedings were a routine application of tribal sovereignty.
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encompass children born to tribal members who left the reservation to give birth, and found that
such an act does not change the domicile of a person who is, in all other respects, domiciled on
the reservation. 124 This, too, was unremarkable; the law of domicile is commonplace in personal
jurisdiction law, and immigration law for children born to expatriate parents employs this rule. 125
But ICWA's jurisdictional provisions go much further. Its jurisdiction-transfer provision
applies to any case anywhere in the country that involves a child eligible for tribal membership,
even if not domiciled on a reservation, and even where no party to the case has any significant
contact with the tribe other than biology. This conflicts with basic jurisdictional principles
required by due process of law. 126
Due process limits personal jurisdiction by requiring that before a court adjudicates a
dispute, there must be "contacts" between the forum jurisdiction and the defendant "such that
[the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 127 Due process of law
simply "does not contemplate" that a court "may make binding a judgment in personam against
an individual" who has "no contacts, ties, or relations" to that court's jurisdiction.128 Where a
person has "carr[ied] on no activity whatsoever" in the forum, and has "avail[ed] [himself] of
none of the privileges and benefits of [the forum's] law," then the forum state cannot exercise
jurisdiction because there are no "affiliating circumstances" 129 that would satisfy the
24 Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48-49.
125 See, e.g., Gaudin v. Remis, 379 F.3d 631, 636-38 (9th Cir. 2004).
126 See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (personal
jurisdiction requirement is part of due process).
127 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Personal jurisdiction requirements also
apply to plaintiffs, of course, but plaintiffs typically submit themselves to a court's personal jurisdiction by filing a
complaint. Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974).
128 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
129 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
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requirements of "fair play and substantial justice."130 And the requirements for personal
jurisdiction in state and federal courts also apply to tribal courts. 131
JCWA plainly exceeds these due process limits by purporting to grant to tribal courts
nationwide jurisdiction over cases involving children with only a biological connection to that
tribe. A child who is merely born eligible for tribal membership-that is, who has the requisite
genetic ancestry-has not thereby purposefully availed herself of any privileges of tribal law.
One cannot "purposefully avail" oneself of one's ethnicity. One could hardly imagine, say, a
Virginia court asserting personal jurisdiction over a child welfare proceeding in California on the
grounds that the child's ancestors came from Virginia, or parents came from Virginia, or that the
child was conceived in Virginia. Yet that is essentially the nationwide jurisdiction JCWA gives
to tribes. The minimum contacts requirement is certainly satisfied when a tribal court exercises
jurisdiction over tribal members domiciled on the reservation, but it is not satisfied in cases
involving off-reservation children whose only connection to a tribe is their biological ancestry.
(Nor have a child's foster or would-be adoptive parents engaged in conduct in connection with
the tribal forum such that tribal jurisdiction satisfies fair play and substantial justice simply
because they foster a child or file an adoption petition in state court.)
1 3 0 Id. at 292 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
131 See, e.g., Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 645 (S.D. 1993) ("the same due process standards which govem
state court assertions of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants apply to tribal courts."). Contra, In re Interest of
Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1068 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that Congress's powers with regard to tribes overrides
the minimum contacts analysis). David Castleman, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1253,
1268 (2006), contends that these limitations on personal jurisdiction are "based on Western values, not tribal ones,"
but sovereignty itself is a "Western concept." DAVID EUGENE WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESKIIK STARK,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 312 (3d ed. 2011). Given that all American
Indians are citizens of the United States, it is appropriate (indeed, mandatory) that Congress protect their due process
rights. In any event, Castleman acknowledges that tribal courts themselves employ the minimum contacts /
purposeful availment analysis. Supra at 1268-77. See also Nelson v. Pfizer, 8 Navajo Rptr. 369, 374 (2003)
(employing minimum contacts test); In re Estate of Tasunke Witko v. G. Heileman Brewing Co (Rosebud Sioux Tr.
Ct., 1994), rev'd 23 Indian L. Rep. 6104 (Rosebud Sioux Sup. Ct. 1996) (same). See further Nell Jessup Newton,
Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 285, 322-26
(1998) (describing application of personal jurisdiction doctrine by tribal courts).
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Congress's trust obligation to preserve tribal sovereignty cannot excuse ICWA from the
mandates of due process and equal protection. However "plenary" Congress's powers with
regard to Indians may be, those powers are "'not absolute"' and cannot trump the Constitution. 132
Nobody would contend, for example, that the trust obligation to preserve tribal sovereignty
would entitle Congress to, say, forbid Indians from relinquishing tribal membership, or leaving
reservations, or marrying non-Indians, or obtaining abortions. 133 All these things would help
increase and strengthen tribal membership, but Congress's powers with regard to its trust
obligation are limited by the Constitution, and particularly by constitutional protections for the
rights of American citizens. 134 Likewise, Congress has no constitutional authority to order that
cases involving children within a biologically defined category be transferred to the jurisdiction
of tribal courts in the absence of minimum contacts.
As in all cases, personal jurisdiction in ICWA cases must satisfy the requirements of due
process, including the "minimum contacts/purposeful availment" analysis. Yet while the
minimum contacts requirement is certainly satisfied when a tribal court exercises jurisdiction
over tribal members domiciled on the reservation, that requirement is not satisfied in cases
involving off-reservation children whose sole connection to a tribe is their ancestry.
132 Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (quoting United States v. Alcea Band of
Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946) (plurality)).
133 Cf KENNEDY, supra note 29, at 513 ("I see little virtue in burdening the living, particularly youngsters who have
no choice in the matter, for the sake of preserving-freezing-group identities as they are presently constituted.").
134 The term "plenary" is misleading. As Justice Thomas has convincingly shown, Congress has no "plenary" power
with regard to Indians. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-26 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). Certainly the
Indian Commerce Clause cannot authorize such power. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the
Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 201, 265 (2007) ("The Indian Commerce Clause was adopted to
grant Congress power to regulate Indian trade between people under state or federal jurisdiction and the tribes . . ..
It did not grant to Congress a police power over the Indians, nor a general power to otherwise intervene in tribal
affairs."). It is hard to see how, if Congress lacks power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to compel
individuals to engage in commerce, see Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012), it
could have power under the Indian Commerce Clause to essentially compel tribal membership.
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In re Armell is a distressing example of the impact that ICWA's jurisdiction transfer
provisions can have on child welfare cases. 135 That case involved a three-and-a-half-year-old
child named Eleanor who was found rummaging through a dumpster in Chicago in 1985.136 She
was suffering from tuberculosis. 137 When her mother was finally located, state child services
workers determined that she was a member of the Winnebago tribe. 138 It was later discovered
that she was not Winnebago, but was eligible for membership in the Potawatomi tribe-though
she was not actually a member. 139 Transfer of jurisdiction to tribal court was twice denied
because Eleanor's mother objected. 140 In the meantime, Eleanor was placed, first with her aunt,
and a month later, when the aunt asked that she be removed, with a foster family. 141 The foster
mother was a member of the Menominee tribe. 142 Two years later, when the case reached trial,
the Winnebago tribe appeared and objected to the foster placement on the grounds that the foster
mother was not Winnebago or Potawatomi. 143 The court stayed proceedings to allow the
Potawatomi tribe to make an appearance, and during that delay, Eleanor was enrolled in the
Potawatomi tribe, without her guardian being made aware of the fact. 144 In April of 1988, three
years after she had been taken into protective custody, the court transferred Eleanor's case to
Potawatomi tribal court. 145
135 550 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
136 Id. at 1062
137 Id.
1 38 Id.
139 Id.
14 0 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
14 Id.
145 Id. at 1063.
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The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer order and concluded that "Congress
expressed a preference for the tribal court to determine these matters regardless of any
psychological impact upon the child." 146 Therefore, "'best interests of the child' considerations
do not provide sufficient bases to deny transfer of jurisdiction." 147 The fact that Eleanor's
mother did not inform authorities she was Potawatomi until two years into the case also made no
difference. 148 Nor did the fact that Eleanor lacked the "minimum contacts" required to satisfy
due process. 149 The court ruled that Congress's Indian Commerce Clause power entitled it to
"legislate even with respect to custody litigation concerning off-reservation Indian children," and
because ICWA was "enacted by Congress to ensure that Indian tribal members are protected,
regardless of the lack of present tribal contacts," the ordinary due process rules of personal
jurisdiction did not apply.150 The fact that Eleanor would be removed from a stable, loving foster
family with whom she had lived for half of her eight years of life was tossed aside because "even
in instances where there is a total lack of contact with a child, an Indian tribe has a very real and
substantive interest in each child."15 1
146 Id.
147 Id. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that the children themselves must be given the opportunity-not provided
by ICWA-to object to jurisdiction transfer in their own cases. In In re J.L., 779 N.W.2d 481 (Iowa 2009), that
court found that although parties "are not allowed to object to a transfer motion based upon the best interests of the
children," the children must be free to object because a transfer determination would affect their interests in familial
relationships and physical safety. Id. at 490 (quoting In the Interest of N.V. & P.V., 744 N.W.2d 634, 630 (Iowa
2008)). The state's blanket prohibition on the children asserting their own best interests deprived them of
individualized determinations of their own cases, and "place [d] the rights of the tribe above the rights of an Indian
child." Id. at 491. This was not narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling interest in ensuring the survival of
Indian tribes. Id. at 490.
148 See Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1068.
149 Id.
150 Id. The court cited Holyfield to support this conclusion, but this was a misreading of Holyfield. That case
involved Indian tribal members who were domiciled on a reservation. If Congress could dispense with the
minimum-contacts requirement with respect to off-reservation Indian children, the Court would not have had to
address the interpretation of the word "domicile." Yet that is what makes up most of the Holyfield decision.
151 Id. at 1069 (emphasis added).
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This cannot be correct. The fact that Congress acts under its Indian Commerce Clause
power, or that it intended to protect tribes, cannot override the requirements of due process. 152
One might argue that ICWA's jurisdictional rules fall within a long-recognized exception
to the minimum contacts requirement called the "status" rule, which allows state courts to hear
certain actions to determine the status of citizens-such as divorce or custody matters-even if
the defendants to those actions are beyond the state courts' jurisdiction. 153 But this argument
would fail because the status exception only allows a court to hear a case where the child is
present in the forum, while the parent is not. 154 That is not what happens in ICWA cases in
which children who lack minimum contacts to the tribal forum, do not live on reservations, and
may never have even visited a reservation, have their fates decided by tribal courts.1 55 Also, the
purposes of the status exception are to prevent jurisdictional conflicts and to ensure that a
custody matter is decided by courts in the state where the child has the closest connection. 156 But
ICWA does not prevent jurisdictional conflicts; it causes them. State court adjudication is
already available in these off-reservation cases, so there is no risk that, absent tribal adjudication,
152 Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1977) (Congress's "plenary" power to legislate with
regard to Indian tribes does not trump due process); cf Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (Congress could not
subject civilian U.S. citizens to military court jurisdiction pursuant to its authority to regulate the military forces);
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (applying purposeful availment / minimum contacts analysis in drug
trafficking case even though Congress can prohibit drug trafficking under the Interstate Commerce Clause). While
jurisdictional limits may be looser in criminal law, see, e.g., United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 944 (D.C. Cir.
2013), domestic child welfare cases are civil law matters quintessentially subject to state court jurisdiction-and to
its limits.
153 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877); Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977).
154 See In re J.D.M.C., 739 N.W.2d 796, 813 (S.D. 2007); State ex rel. W.A., 63 P.3d 607, 616 (Utah 2002) (status
exception enables state courts to determine interests of children residing in that state, and in order to prevent putting
children in legal limbo); McCaffery v. Green, 931 P.2d 407, 411 (Alaska 1997) ("the ties and relations between a
parent and child create ties and relations between the parent and the state in which the child lives sufficient to satisfy
notions of fairness in exercising personal jurisdiction.").
155 Consider, for instance, Renteria v. Shingle Springs Band ofMiwok Indians, No. 2:16-CV-1685-MCE-AC, 2016
WL 4597612 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016). That case involved three children whose parents were killed in a car
accident, and whose custody then was disputed by surviving family members. Neither the children nor the parents
ever lived on reservation, or even in the same county as the reservation, yet the Miwok tribal court asserted
jurisdiction to order the children placed with a tribal member.
156 State ex rel. W.A., 63 P.3d at 616; In re Thomas J.R., 663 N.W.2d 736, 747 (2003).
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the parties might lack a forum. Nor does tribal court jurisdiction over off-reservation children
ensure that their cases are decided by the court closest to the child. On the contrary, it requires
that their cases-which would ordinarily be decided by state courts under non-discriminatory
state law-be decided instead by an entity, perhaps geographically distant, which is connected to
the child solely by race. The resulting jurisdictional clashes, with lengthy disputes over whether
"good cause" exists to deny transfer, and often with time-consuming appeals and remands,
frequently disrupt what would otherwise be a routine matter. Finally, the status exception is
applicable only where the exercise of jurisdiction "is in the child's interest, not merely the
interest or convenience of the feuding parties." 157 But many courts have deemed the child's best
interest to be an improper consideration with regard to ICWA's jurisdiction transfer
requirements.1 5 8
The South Dakota Supreme Court has approached something like a status-exception
theory in ICWA cases. In one case, it declared that tribal jurisdiction depends "on whether the
matter demands exercise of the tribe's responsibility of self-government. There can be no
greater threat to essential tribal relations and to the tribal power of self-government than to
interfere in questions of custody of tribal members." 159 But the self-government question is
relevant to the question of retained sovereignty, and thus ultimately relevant to subject-matter
jurisdiction-it simply does not address the due process requirements of personal jurisdiction.
The importance of a subject matter to tribal self-government is a factor in the determination of
157 In re Thomas J.R., 663 N.W.2d at 741-42.
151 See Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 169 (Tex. App. 1995); In re Armell, 194 Ill. App. 3d 31,
39 (1990); C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); In re Interest of Zylena R., 284 Neb. 834,
851-52 (2012); Contra, In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287, 828 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991); In re Robert T., 200 Cal. App. 3d 657, 665 (1988); In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 308 (1988); In re
N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 869 (Okla. 1988); In re J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 331 (S.D. 1990).
159 People ex. rel. G.R.F., 569 N.W.2d 29, 33 (S.D. 1997) (quoting In re D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281
(S.D. 1980)).
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whether a tribe retains inherent sovereignty to govern that subject. 160 It does not resolve the
additional question of whether a tribe has personal jurisdiction over parties who are beyond tribal
limits, 161 let alone over off-reservation children who have no cultural affiliation with that tribe
and are only eligible for membership on account of their ancestry. The South Dakota Supreme
Court seemed to recognize that fact when it noted that the basis of tribal jurisdiction in ICWA
cases is "the child's relationship with the tribe through residency, domicile, or as a ward of the
tribal court."162 In short, the importance of child welfare matters to the longevity of the tribe
does not override the ordinary requirements of personal jurisdiction, or justify employing the
status exception where it would not ordinarily apply.
In In re J.D.M C., the same court found that tribal judges lacked personal jurisdiction
over a non-Indian father in a child abuse matter that occurred off-reservation, and where neither
he, nor the mother, nor the children, were ever residents of, or domiciled on, the reservation. 163
Given that the father was "a nonresident, non-tribal member who never resided or domiciled on
the reservation," and who had "not purposefully availed himself to the benefits and protections
of the laws of the . . . reservation," the court found that the father's "connections" with the tribe
were "too attenuated to constitute minimum contacts," and thus the tribe could not exercise
personal jurisdiction consistently with due process of law. 164 This common-sense application of
160 See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 425-26 (1989);
161 See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 2011) ("To exercise its
inherent civil authority over a defendant, a tribal court must have both subject matter jurisdiction-consisting of
regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction-and personal jurisdiction.").
162 The South Dakota Supreme Court seemed to recognize that fact when it noted that the basis of tribal jurisdiction
in ICWA cases is "the child's relationship with the tribe through residency, domicile, or as a ward of the tribal
court." G.R.F., 569 N.W.2d at 33 (emphasis added).
163 739 N.W.2d 796 (S.D. 2007).
"
1 d. at 812. See also Merrill v. Altman, 807 N.W.2d 821 (S.D. 2011) (tribal court lacked exclusive jurisdiction
under ICWA in custody case involving children who were members of tribe but were not domiciled on reservation).
3 1
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the minimum contacts test should govern ICWA cases, too. People with no minimum contacts to
the tribal court should not be haled into tribal court solely on account of their biological ancestry.
2. Federalism
ICWA's interference with state court jurisdiction also collides with principles of
federalism. There is typically no disputing the federal government's power to preempt states
with regard to Indian law, but such preemption is problematic when it is stretched to include off-
reservation matters involving children who are not members of a tribe, but only eligible for
membership for biological reasons. Family law is quintessentially a subject of state concern, left
to the purview of the states by the Tenth Amendment. 165 So great is the role of states in this area
that federal courts even lack authority to decide divorce or child custody cases in diversity
jurisdiction. 166 Primary responsibility for family law is with the states, subject to the limits of
federal constitutional protections. 167
But ICWA overrides state jurisdiction over family law, and-as explained below-
dictates substantive law that state officials must implement in family law adjudications. In doing
so, it disrupts what would otherwise be the uniform application of state law relating to foster
care, custody, or adoption, without regard to race, ethnicity, or national origin. ICWA overrides
this nondiscriminatory state law, and segregates "Indian children" into a special category subject
to different rules, solely as a consequence of their ethnicity.
In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court held the federal Defense of Marriage Act
unconstitutional in part because it interfered with state family law and mandated discrimination
165 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
166 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-07 (1992).
167 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013).
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where none would have applied otherwise. 168 Many states had chosen to broaden the definition
of marriage to include same-sex couples, the Court noted, but the Defense of Marriage Act
"intrude[d] on state power" and forced states to discriminate against same-sex couples. 169 By
imposing separate legal treatment where state law would ordinarily have applied a non-
discriminatory rule, the Act "disrupt[ed] the federal balance." 170 The same is true of ICWA. It
subjects children whose ethnic ancestry renders them eligible for tribal membership to unequal
treatment, and overrides non-discriminatory state law in a way that makes it harder to ensure
their safety and to find them adoptive homes.
True, ICWA was intended in part to remedy past discrimination, and Congress has power
to override state law when necessary for this purpose. 171 But such intervention imposes current
burdens and must be justified by current needs.172 Whatever need there may have been a
generation ago for federal intervention to protect American Indians from abuse at the hands of
state child protection agencies, that cannot justify the continued intrusion on state law matters
without some showing that those abuses remain, and that ICWA resolves them in a
constitutionally acceptable manner. 173
168 See id. at 2692.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See generally Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
172 Cf Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013). See also Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665-
66 (9th Cir. 1997) (where social and economic conditions of indigenous population have changed, legislation that
addresses their interests may be rendered unconstitutional).
173 Indian children are still removed from Indian homes and placed in non-Indian homes at a disproportionately high
rate, but as the problems of poverty, alcoholism, drug abuse, and domestic violence are disproportionately higher in
Indian country, this fact alone cannot show that the problems ICWA was enacted to redress still remain. See
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 306 (4th ed. 2012) ("The extent to which these disparities
are due to persistent bias and prejudice as opposed to legitimate responses to child abuse and neglect cannot be
determined with any degree of certainty."). Of course, there are still abuses, including the shocking case of Oglala
Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749 (D.S.D. 2015). But the abuses involved there were sufficiently
addressed by due process protections. See id. at 769-72.
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ICWA violates another essential protection for federalism: the anti-commandeering rule.
The federal government may not force state officers or state legislatures to enforce federal
law. 174 In Printz v. United States, 175 the Supreme Court found the Brady Act of 1993
unconstitutional because it "direct[ed] state law enforcement officers to participate, albeit only
temporarily, in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme." 176 People selling
firearms were required to submit information forms to these officers so that background checks
could be performed. 177 Notably, the Act instructed officers to "make a reasonable effort" to
determine whether a proposed firearm purchase was legal. 178 If an officer determined that a sale
would violate the law, the Act required the officer to give the would-be buyer a written
explanation. If the purchase was legal, the officer was instructed to destroy the paperwork. 179
Like the Brady Act, ICWA commands not only state judges but also state executive
officers to participate in the administration of a federal regulatory program-one that overrides
the quintessential state-law realm of family law. Among other things, it orders state child
welfare officers to place children in foster care or adoptive families in conformity with its
preferences,1so mandates state record-keeping and inspection practices, and requires that state
officers make "active efforts" to reunite Indian families-which includes "provid[ing] remedial
services and rehabilitative programs" to abusive parents. 182 In striking down the Brady Act, the
Printz Court was particularly troubled by the Act's "reasonable efforts" provision, noting that it
174 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-66 (1992).
175 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
176 Id. at 904.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 903-04.
1s 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
"s' Id. § 1915(e).
182 Id. § 1912(d).
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essentially compelled states to adopt compliant policies, and "'dragooned"' state officers "into
administering federal law." 183 ICWA does precisely this-commanding not only that states
adopt and implement "active efforts" policies, but also that they comply with the administration
of a federally-mandated body of family law.
The recent BIA Guidelines are even more express in directly commanding state courts.
They use the word "must" 101 times while instructing state agencies and officers. The
Guidelines are meant to "clarify the minimum Federal standards, and best practices . . . to ensure
that ICWA is applied in all States consistent with the Act's express language," 184 and include
instructions such as: "The agency seeking a[n] ... adoptive ... placement of an Indian child
must always follow the placement preferences."1 8 5 State courts often insist that the Guidelines
are not mandatory, 186 but they are certainly phrased in mandatory language.
In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton found it so hard to imagine the federal
government trying "by some forced constructions of its authority" to "vary the [state] law"
relating to inheritance or other domestic matters that only the "imprudent zeal" of the
Constitution's opponents could envision such a thing. 187 Yet with ICWA, Congress has not only
varied the law of child welfare for one specific ethnic group, but has compelled state officials to
develop and implement a special set of standards that deviates from the state-law norm-often in
ways that harm children.
B. "Active Efforts" to Reunify Families
183 Printz, 521 U.S. at 927-28.
184 Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 10146, 10150 A.1 (Feb. 25, 2015) (emphasis added).
1 I5 1d. at 10157, F.1(b) (emphasis added).
186 See, e.g., In re M.K.T., 368 P.3d 771, 783-84; (Okla. 2016); Brenda 0. v. Arizona Dep't. of Econ. Sec., 226
Ariz. 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2010); In re Interest of Tavian B., 292 Neb. 804, 815 (2016) (Stacy, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("we are under no obligation to follow the guidelines.").
187 THE FEDERALIST No. 33 at 206 (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton).
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ICWA differs from state law in many ways, with the result that Indian children are
treated differently than children of other ethnicities in cases that are otherwise the same. Given
that this law deals with the welfare of abused or neglected children, these differences can have a
profound impact on the lives of America's most vulnerable citizens.
The most significant of these differences involve efforts to reunify families after children
have been taken into state custody. State law, as well as the federal Adoption and Safe Families
Act, 18 8 requires that child-welfare officials make "reasonable efforts" to reunify families in such
cases. 189 But the rules are different for Indian children: in their cases, state officials must make
"active efforts" toward reunification. 190 Although some state courts regard these terms as
synonymous, 191 most have concluded that "active efforts" imposes a greater obligation on the
government to reunite children with families after a removal than does the "reasonable efforts"
standard. 192 The BIA's Guidelines also take this position, 193 although its new regulations make
no explicit determination. 194
As a practical matter, the difference can be enormous. "Active efforts" is typically
distinguished from "passive efforts," such as making counseling services or similar opportunities
18 Pub. Law. 105-89, § 111 Stat. 2129 (1997).
189 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (2016); IOWA CODE § 232.102(5)(b); MINN. STAT.
§ 260.012(a).
190 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
191 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Hannah S., 142 Cal. App. 4th 988, 998 (2006) ("Active efforts are essentially
equivalent to reasonable efforts to provide or offer reunification services in a non-ICWA case and must likewise be
tailored to the circumstances of the case.").
192 See, e.g., In re Shayla H., 22 Neb. App. 8 (Neb. Ct. App. 2014), aff'd, 289 Neb. 473 (2014); People ex rel. A.R.,
310 P.3d 1007, 1015 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012); In re JL, 770 N.W.2d 853, 865 (Mich. 2009); In re Welfare of Children
of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); In re A.N., 106 P.3d 556, 560-61 (Mont. 2005); In re Interest
of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 865 (2008); In re J.S., 177 P.3d 590, 593 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008); Dep't of Human
Services v. K.C.J., 228 Or. App. 70, 74 (2009); State ex rel. C.D., 200 P.3d 194, 205 (Utah. Ct. App. 2008). See
also Megan Scanlon, From Theory to Practice: Incorporating the "Active Efforts" Requirement in Indian Child
Welfare Act Proceedings, 43 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 629, 646-54 (2011).
193 Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10150-5 1, A.2(15).
194 The regulations chose simply to omit reference to "reasonable efforts," rather than to compare "active" and
"reasonable" efforts. 81 Fed. Reg. at 38791.
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available for parents who wish to reunify their families. While passive efforts might satisfy the
"reasonable efforts" standard, it is insufficient to discharge a state's duties under ICWA's active
efforts mandate. 195 Instead, ICWA requires state social services workers to positively assist in
developing parenting skills, obtaining employment, or whatever else the parent must have to
retain custody, even if the parent shows little progress or even demonstrates a lack of interest. 196
"Reunification" of the family requires a delicate balance, because it might mean the
restoration of normal relationships after a bad episode in the family's history-or it can mean
returning a child to a known abusive family where the child will suffer repeated instances of
abuse or neglect. ICWA's "active efforts" provision is so poorly designed that it often has the
perverse effect of exposing Indian children to a greater risk of abuse or neglect, and frequently
results in delaying or denying protection children need.
Most courts have ruled that because ICWA's active efforts requirement is more stringent
than "reasonable efforts," the circumstances that would ordinarily relieve the state of the
obligation to reunite the family under the "reasonable efforts" standard do not relieve the state of
the obligation to make active efforts. 197 This means that while officials are not required to
reunify a non-Indian child with a family after she is removed due to parental substance-abuse
problems, or physical or sexual abuse, 198 such a duty does exist with regard to Indian children.
Even incarceration of the parent does not relieve state child welfare workers of their duty to
195 See, e.g., A.A. v. State, Dep't of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1999).
196 ICWA requires that "remedial services" be provided to parents, up to and including "the bizarre undertaking of
'stimulat[ing]' a biological father's 'desire to be a parent,"' Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2563
(2013). Only after such efforts prove fruitless, and it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the parent lacks
interest in caring for the child, can parental rights be terminated under ICWA. See, e.g., Loren R. v. Arizona Dep't
of Econ. Sec., No. 1 CA-JV 12-0158, 2013 WL 119664, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013); In re Noah B., No.
CP00013544A, 2005 WL 648058, at *18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2005).
197 See, e.g., In re. People ex rel. J.S.B., Jr., 691 N.W.2d 611, 618 (S.D. 2005).
198 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2012); In re Interest of Ethan M., 723 N.W.2d 363, 372-74 (Neb. Ct. App.
2006); New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.R.G., 179 N.J. 264, 283-85 (2004).
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actively seek reunification of Indian children and birth parents. 199 The BIA's recently announced
Guidelines expand the active efforts requirement, mandating that state officials prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that active efforts have been unsuccessful, and prove this through the
testimony of an expert witness who is an expert in the culture and customs of the child's tribe (as
opposed to an expert on child welfare or child psychology). 200 And the BIA's 2016 regulations
provide that the "active efforts" requirement must apply as soon as state officers have "reason to
know"-often merely a suspicion-that a child is subject to ICWA.201
The Supreme Court held in 2013 that "active efforts" are not required in cases where the
birth parent has never had contact with the child, in which case there is no Indian family
threatened with breakup. 202 But the "active efforts" requirement may be more problematic in
cases where the birth parent has had contact, because in such cases, that requirement can force
state officials to return children to the very parents who have abused them in the first place.
One example of this is In re Interest of Shayla H.,203 in which Nebraska child welfare
officials removed three children, Shayla (12), Shania (11), and Tanya (9) from their birth father,
David, due to allegations of physical abuse. 204 Specifically, Shayla had been beaten by David's
girlfriend, Danielle (not the children's mother), and child welfare officials found that all three
were suffering from neglect. Shania and Tanya were enrolled members of the Sioux tribe, and
199 A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 827 (Alaska 1995).
200 Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10156, D.2 & D.3. The 2016 regulations "decline[d] to establish a uniform standard
of proof' with regard to active efforts, but promised further evaluation for "future rulemakings." 81 Fed. Reg. at
38816.
201 BIA Regulations § 23.107, 81 Fed. Reg. at 38869-70. California Rules of Court also require that ICWA be
applied whenever there is "reason to know" the child is an Indian child. Cal. R. Ct. 5.48 1. Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg.
at 10156, D.2 & D.3. The 2016 regulations "decline[d] to establish a unifonn standard of proof' with regard to
active efforts, but promised further evaluation for "future rulemakings." 81 Fed. Reg. at 38816.
202 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2562 (2013).
203 846 N.W.2d 668 (Neb. App. 2014), aff'd 855 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 2014).
20 Id. at 672.
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although Shayla was not, she was eligible for membership. The children were returned to the
family, and over the next seven months, David and Danielle participated in counseling services
geared toward reunification. 205 However, the children showed signs of continuing problems.
The trial court concluded that it was in their best interests that custody remain with state social
services, although they were physically returned to the couple. 206 The court also required David
to cooperate with state child welfare investigations, to desist from physical discipline of the
children, to provide them with therapy, etc. 207
The Appellate Court reversed, on the grounds that although the state had employed
"reasonable" efforts at reunifying the children with David, it had not employed active efforts. 208
The trial court's finding that the children's best interests would be best served by the state
retaining legal custody was therefore insufficient. 209 The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed,
holding that even though the children remained in the birth parent's physical custody, the
decision to withhold legal custody fell short of the active efforts requirement. 210 Only briefly
noted in the court's opinion was the fact that "the children were subsequently removed from
David's physical custody." 211 That was because by the time the court ruled, David had once
again abused the three, as well as other children.212 In May, 2015, the Juvenile Court found him
"unfit by reason of debauchery or repeated lewd and lascivious behavior" 213 and "callous
205 Id.
2 06 Id.
2 0 7 Id. at 673.
2 0 8 Id. at 677-78.
209 See In re Interest ofShayla H., 846 N.W.2d at 678.
210 State of Nebraska v. Daphne Hansen, 855 N.W.2d, 777. (Neb. 2014).
211 Id. at 776.
2 12 Id.
213 In re Interest of Shayla H., et al., Doc. JV13 (Juvenile Court of Lancaster County, May 1, 2015) at 3 (on file with
Goldwater Institute).
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disregard for those children's emotional well-being." 214 David, a methamphetamine addict, had
molested Danielle's son and daughter as well as his own youngest daughter, and had failed to
protect his three daughters from sexual molestation by Danielle's sons. 215 The court concluded
that all three girls had "experienced lifetimes of trauma." 216 Had the courts applied the best
interests standard as the overriding consideration from the outset-and had state officials not
been required to make "active efforts" to reunite Shayla, Shania, and Tanya with their abusive
father-much needless suffering could have been avoided.
Even more disturbing is the case of Declan Stewart, an Oklahoma Cherokee boy who was
beaten to death in 2007 at the age of five by his mother's boyfriend.217 Declan had been
removed from his mother's custody eighteen months earlier when he appeared with signs of
severe physical abuse, including a fractured skull and a bruised rectum. 218 But when state social
services workers sought to terminate the mother's rights, the Cherokee tribe objected, insisting
upon "reunification."219 Five weeks after Declan was returned to his mother's physical custody,
he died in unimaginable agony. 220
Even in less extreme circumstances, ICWA's "active efforts" provision inflicts
unnecessary psychological harm on children. In Department ofHuman Services v. IM,221 the
Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision to clear a child, referred to as L, for
214 Id. at 19.
215 Id. at 18.
2 16 Id.
217 Nolan Clay & Randy Ellis, U.S. Law Pushed Boy Home before He Died Tribal Statute Advocates Reunifying
Split Families, NEWS OK (Oct. 4, 2007), http://newsok.conarticle/3140271/1191472787. See also Alice
Collinsworth, Report Details Child's Abuse, Death, EDMONDSUN.COM (Oct. 4, 2007),
http://www.edmondsun.coninews/local-news/report-details-child-s-abuse-death/article_9f84660f-6a42-5a24-a4d7-
9b39451418fa.html.
218 Mark Flatten, Death on A Reservation 25 (Goldwater Institute, 2015), https://goldwater-
media.s3.amazonaws.com/cms-page-media/2015/8/14/Final%20Epic%20pamplet.pdf.
219 Id.
2201 d. at 25-26; Collinsworth, supra note 222.
221 266 Or. App. 453, 455 (2014).
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adoption. 222 The case began in 2009, when state officials removed L's sibling from the birth
parents on the basis of neglect.223 That sibling was eventually adopted.224 Three years later, L
was born, and child welfare workers sought to take him into custody two days after his birth.225
The parents were diagnosed with mental and emotional problems, as well as anger management
and aggression problems, 226 but because L was an Indian child, ICWA's "active efforts" mandate
applied.227
Thus, in late 2012, the state presented the parents with rehabilitation and treatment plans
requiring counseling, parenting classes, and regular visits with L.228 But the parents skipped
sessions, paid little attention to the classes, and had repeated emotional outbursts, including
storming out of an anger management session.229 Nevertheless, the state persisted in its efforts
throughout 2013. The parents were frequently uncooperative, and the counseling sessions,
conducted with L present, often ended in tension and frustration. 230 "At a June session," the
court later found, "father used abusive language and behavior towards [the counselor] in L's
presence; neither parent recognized how such behavior could be frightening for L." 231 The
father's "explosive behavior and inappropriate language" had led the counselor to terminate
other sessions, all leading to greater anxiety and delay,232 but the state continued its efforts.233
Only after eighteen months of persistent failures of this sort did the trial court rule that L could
222 Id. at 456.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
2 26 J.M., 266 Or. App. at 456-57.
2 27 Id. at 464-66.
228 Id. at 464.
229 Id. at 464-66.
2 30 Id. at 466.
231 Id. at 467.
232 J.M., 266 Or. App. at 466-67.
233 Id.
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be removed from the parents and placed in foster care. 234 The parents then appealed, and the
court of appeals rendered its decision ten months later, in October of 2014.235 A petition to the
state Supreme Court followed, and was not denied until February 2015, when L was four years
old.236
ICWA's "active efforts" requirement returns abused children to the custody of abusive
adults, forces children to experience the strain of parents' psychological or social problems to a
greater degree than other children must experience under the "reasonable efforts" rule, increases
the stress on foster families, prolongs the adoption process, and encourages unnecessary
technical appeals. 237 Courts in California-one of only two states to embrace the proposition
that "active efforts" does not apply when parents prove unfit-have observed that ICWA "was
not intended as a shield to permit abusive treatment of Indian children by their parents." 238 But
in practice, that frequently happens.
C. Different Burdens of Proof for Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights
In cases involving non-Indian children, the decision to place a child in foster care is made
by employing such burdens of proof as "reasonable grounds," or "probable cause," or
"preponderance of the evidence." These standards have been carefully chosen to strike a balance
between the rights of parents not to lose custody on too light a basis, and the rights of children
not to be left in an abusive household simply because state officers have been unable to gather
234 Id.
235 Id. at 453.
236 Dep't of Hum. Serv. v. J.M., 356 Or. 689 (2015).
237 Ashley E. Brennan, ChildAbuse Is Color Blind: Why the Involuntary Termination ofParental Rights Provision
of the Indian Child Welfare Act Should Be Reformed, 89 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 257, 278 (2012).
2381 In re K.B., 173 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1285 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also In re T.S., 315
P.3d 1030, 1049 (Okl. 2014) ("The Indian Child Welfare Act was not intended as a shield to permit abusive
treatment of Indian children by their parents or to allow Indian children to be abused, neglected, or forlorned under
the guise of cultural identity." (citations and quotation marks omitted.))
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definitive evidence. Arizona law, for example, allows state officials to remove a child from an
abusive home in an emergency and place that child in temporary foster care on a showing that
"reasonable grounds exist to believe that temporary custody is clearly necessary to protect the
child," and that "probable cause exists to believe" that the child is suffering or will imminently
suffer abuse, neglect, or serious emotional injury. 239 Arizona law also uses a "preponderance of
evidence" standard in determining dependency-i.e., placing children in long-term foster care. 240
In Santosky v. Kramer,24 1 the Supreme Court employed the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard, finding that anything less demanding would violate the due process rights of
parents-their interests are too significant to be disposed of on a mere preponderance-of-the-
evidence basis.242 But the Court also declined to adopt the more demanding "beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt" requirement, because the type of psychological evidence relied upon in family
law cases is not usually susceptible of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 243 and such a demanding
rule might "erect an unreasonable barrier to state efforts to free permanently neglected children
for adoption." 244 This latter point is important because termination is often necessary to clear the
way for permanent adoption and allow a child from a troubled home to find a new, permanent,
loving family.24 5
239 A.R.S. § 8-821(A)-(B).
240 In re Appeal In Cochise Cty. Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 133 Ariz. 157, 159 (1982); A.R.S. § 8-844(C).
241 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
242 Id. at 758.
243 Id. at 769.
2 1Id. The Court observed in passing that ICWA was the "only analogous federal statute of which we are aware"
that "permits termination of parental rights solely upon 'evidence beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id. at 749-50.
Although it did not address the constitutionality of that requirement, it did note that in passing ICWA "Congress did
not consider . .. the evidentiary problems that would arise if proof beyond a reasonable doubt were required in all
state-initiated parental rights termination hearings."
245 Termination is not a legal prerequisite to voluntary adoption, but it is for involuntary adoption cases, and it
ensures that adoptive families are not forced to allow visitation with unfit birth parents.
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ICWA disregards this warning, however, and imposes heavier burdens of proof in cases
involving Indian children than apply to children of other races. In order to place an Indian child
in foster care, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence-as opposed to reasonable
grounds or probable cause-that allowing the child to remain in the parent's custody "is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child," and such a funding must be based
on expert testimony. 246 And in cases involving termination ofparental rights, ICWA imposes
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard that the Santosky Court rejected.247 These different
burdens mean that "caseworkers and attorneys are sometimes reluctant to accept surrenders of, or
terminate parental rights to, an Indian child," 248 even where that would be in the child's best
interest. Obtaining expert testimony is costly for social services agencies operating on limited
budgets and staff.249 Requiring proof of serious physical damage is also likely to delay the
removal of children from dangerous situations.
One distressingly common fact pattern in cases involving termination (as well as "active
efforts") occurs when the parents of an Indian child separate, and the mother remarries. When
her new husband seeks to adopt her child as his own, the ex-husband is then empowered to use
ICWA to block what would otherwise be the formation of a stable new family.250 This is often
not only contrary to the child's best interests, but to the wishes of Indian parents themselves. 251
246 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e).
24 7 Id. § 1915(f).
248 Debra Ratterman Baker, Indian Child Welfare Act, 15 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 28, 28 (1995).
249 See Hollinger, supra note 10, at 500 ("Congressional funding for the remedial services authorized by the ICWA
has consistently been lower than the $12 million per annum recommended by the Senate Select Committee. State
welfare programs are often unavailable for reservation domiciliaries.").
250 See, e.g., In re N.B., 199 P.3d 16 (Colo. App. 2007); State ex. rel. D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
Adoption of Lindsay C., 229 Cal. App. 3d 404 (1991); In re Crystal K. 226 Cal.App.3d 655 (1990).
251 One example of the kinds of delays imposed by ordinary application of ICWA is In re Adoption ofJosiah P.,
2016 WL 245200 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2016). A young unmarried couple, Jessica and Tyler, ended their
relationship after about six months. Id. at **1-2. Tyler was a habitual drug abuser, unfaithful, and often verbally
abusive to Jessica. Id. at *1. He provided her no financial support for her, despite having plenty of expendable
income. Id. at *5. He admitted repeatedly that he was uninterested in parenting a child, and showed no interest in
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For example, In re Adoption of TA. W 252 involved a child born in 2007 to C.B., a
member of the Shoalwater Bay Tribe, and a non-Indian birth father, C.W. 253 C.W. was a
methamphetamine addict, and in 2009, after an incident of domestic violence, C.B. obtained a
temporary protection order against him.254 C.W. had what the trial court later called a
"significant criminal history," including convictions for drug possession, car theft, fleeing the
police, and burglary.255 At some point in 2009, he stopped visiting T.A.W.256 When, in 2012, he
was released from prison, C.B. obtained a protective order against him from the Shoalwater
tribal court.257 It ordered C.W. to undergo six months of domestic violence classes before he
could visit with the child.258
In the meantime, C.B. met and married another man, R.B.-an Indian-in June, 2013.
C.W. was back in prison by then, this time to serve two years for robbery. 259 C.B. and R.B. then
asked a state court to terminate his parental rights, preparatory to R.B. adopting the child as his
own. The tribe supported this move, and the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
providing for Jessica. Id. She volunteered her child for adoption, and the day after the child's birth, in August, 2014,
signed the adoption placement agreement. Id. at **1-3, 4-7. Two days later, the adoptive parents filed a motion to
terminate Tyler's rights. Id. at *3. Jessica was unaware of any Indian ancestry. Id. But Tyler never received the
form asking if he had any Indian ancestry. Id. As a result, in January, 2016, the California Court of Appeal ordered
that the case be remanded to the trial court to determine whether Tyler had Indian ancestry. Id. at **8-9. If he were
to answer yes, the adoption proceeding would be subject to vacatur and tribal intervention, and the child's adoptive
parents-who have taken care of the child for more than two years-could lose custody to a family chosen by the
tribe. See also In re S.L., 2006 WL 477772, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (remanding termination case for non-
compliance with ICWA seven years previously).
252 383 P.3d 492 (2016).
253 Id. at 494.
254 Id. at 494-95.
255 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Termination, In re Adoption of T.A.W., No. 13-5-00015-9
(Aug. 21, 2014) (on file with Goldwater Institute); Memorandum Opinion, In re Adoption of T.A.W., No. 13-5-
00015-9 (July 24, 2014) at 3-5 (on file with Goldwater Institute).
256 383 P.3d at 495.
257.Id.
258 In re Adoption of TA. W, 188 Wash. App. 799, 804-05 (2015).
259 Supplemental Brief of Respondent, In re Adoption of T.A.W., (Wash. Sup. Ct. No. 92127-0) at 2 (on file with
Goldwater Institute).
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requirements of ICWA were satisfied.260 But the Court of Appeals disagreed. 261 It found
insufficient evidence in the record "that active efforts were made to provide C.W. with remedial
services and rehabilitative programs to prevent the breakup of the Indian family." 262 The fact
that C.W. was not an Indian was irrelevant, the court found, because "the plain language of
ICWA states that its provisions apply to the termination of parental rights to an Indian child
without regard to a parent's status." 263 In short, despite plentiful reason for concluding that C.W.
was an unfit parent, despite the fact that he chose to absent himself from his child's life, despite
the best judgment of both the Indian mother and her tribe, and despite the fact that ICWA was
operating in this case to interfere with the Indian parent's choices, contrary to the wishes of the
tribe, and in service to the desires of the non-Indian birth parent, the court barred the termination
(and consequent adoption) because the parties had not made "timely and diligent efforts" to
"engag[e] [C.W.] ... in reasonably available and culturally appropriate preventive, remedial, or
rehabilitative services."264
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed. "[W]hether the parent whose rights are being
terminated is non-Indian is immaterial," it found.265 Consequently the "active efforts" provision
of ICWA-which requires the state to prove that "active efforts have been made to . . . to prevent
the breakup of the Indian family" 266 -meant the state must provide remedial services to a non-
260 In re Adoption of TA. W., 188 Wash. App. at 806.
261 Id. at 799.
262 Id. at 806-07.
263 Id. at 808-09.
264 WASH. REV. CODE § 13.38.040. In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the South Carolina Supreme Court observed
that the "active efforts" provision "requires that remedial services be offered to . . . attempt[] to stimulate Father's
desire to be a parent." 398 S.C. 625, 647 (2012). The United States Supreme Court, in reversing this decision,
observed that "if prospective adoptive parents were required to engage in the bizarre undertaking of 'stimulat[ing]' a
biological father's 'desire to be a parent,' it would surely dissuade some of them from seeking to adopt Indian
children." Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2563-64 (2013).
265 2016 WL 6330589, at *8 (Wash. Oct. 27, 2016)
266 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
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Indian birth parent-"culturally appropriate" services, no less. One dissenting justice pointed
out the absurdity of this outcome: "Indian child T.A.W. is in an Indian home with his Indian
natural mother and with an Indian stepfather with whom T.A.W. has bonded." 267 To allow a
non-Indian to bar that adoption under a statute intended to prevent the breakup of Indian families
is nonsensical.
In In re D.S., the Indiana Supreme Court reversed a decision terminating the parental
rights of an Indian mother not residing on a reservation.268 The child, born prematurely to
alcohol-abusing parents, was removed and placed in foster care while the parents underwent
treatment programs. Two years later, when the birth mother had failed to complete program, a
state trial court, wrongly concluding that ICWA did not apply, found by clear and convincing
evidence that the termination of her parental rights was in the child's best interests. 269 It based
its conclusion on the testimony of expert witnesses, but the state high court remanded for
application of "federal law, which imposes a greater evidentiary burden of proof," 270 and noted
that the expert witnesses must be "specific[ally] qualif[ied] related to the placement of Native
American Indian children." 271
In In re Custody of S.E. G., the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a trial court's finding
that three Indian children were better off in the custody of their non-Indian foster parents. 272
Social services removed the children from the birth parents when one was four, another three,
and another one year old, and were placed in foster care. 273 Over the three years that followed,
267 2016 WL 6330589, at *18 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
268 577 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 1991).
269 Id. at 573.
2 70 Id. at 575.
271 Id. at 576. The decision made no mention of the parental rights of the birth father, who, being Caucasian, would
not be entitled to the "greater evidentiary burden" that preserved the birth mother's parental rights.
272 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994).
273 Id. at 59.
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they were moved six times before being placed with the non-Indian couple, E.C. and C.C., in
1991.274 A year later, the children were placed with an Indian family, but that only lasted nine
days before they were returned to E.C. and C.C. 275 Therapists who met with the children
emphasized their need for permanent family bonds, particularly one special-needs child.276 After
another year of searching, the tribe was unable to locate an Indian family willing to adopt the
three, but E.C. and C.C. were willing, and nobody disputed their fitness. 277
In its adoption proceeding, the trial court received evidence from both lay and expert
witnesses, all of whom testified that the couple were providing for the children's physical,
emotional, and intellectual needs, but who disagreed as to whether they were providing for the
children's "cultural needs." 278 E.C. and C.C. attended powwows and tribal story-tellings, and
even arranged a Chippewa naming ceremony for one child,279 and the court found that, in any
event, the most important thing was for the children to find stable and secure homes.280 In
affirming the trial court, the court of appeal noted that the Indian foster home in which the
children had previously been placed "was unwilling to make any long-term commitment to the
children," whereas E.C. and C.C. "have a successful track record with the children and are at
present both willing to assume and capable of meeting the children's needs for a permanent and
stable home." 281
274 Id. at 359.
275 Id. at 359-60.
276 Id. at 365.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 365.
279 Id. at 361.
280 Matter of Custody of S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)..
281 Id.
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Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled this concern and reversed the trial
court's adoption order. 282 It found that the expert witnesses E.C. and C.C. offered were not
qualified experts specifically on Indian tribal culture and childrearing practices, which meant
their testimony was insufficient to support a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding that the
children's "cultural needs" were being met.283 Thus, although nobody disputed that adoption by
E.C. and C.C. was in the children's best interests, the court subordinated the children's
individual needs to other matters; indeed, it found that the best interests standard was improper
under ICWA because it is "imbued with the values of majority culture," as opposed to Indian
culture. 284
In a South Dakota case, In re N.S., a non-Indian mother with recurrent psychiatric
problems and alcoholism volunteered her child for adoption, then withdrew the request, then
requested it again, then withdrew her request again.285 Twice more, she offered the child for
adoption and changed her mind.286 Social services workers reported a "lack of bonding between
N.S. and his mother and that N.S. was extremely out of control."287 After two foster placements,
the child was returned to the mother, who then volunteered the child for adoption yet again. 288
Then the child was placed in his grandmother's care, but less than a month later, she asked social
services to take the child away. 289 Finally, when the child was a little more than two years old,
the court terminated parental rights. 290 It found beyond a reasonable doubt that termination was
28211 re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 365 (Minn. 1994).
2 83 Id.
284 Id. at 363.
285 474 N.W.2d 96 (S.D. 1991).
2 86 Id.
287 Id. at 98.
28a8 Id.
289 Id. at 97-98.
290 Id.
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in the child's best interest, but also found by clear and convincing evidence that it was
"necessary for the child's physical and mental well-being." 291 Only after termination was N.S.'s
paternity confirmed, and the father was found to be a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux
tribe.292 The South Dakota Supreme Court therefore concluded that the trial court had erred, and
remanded for still more proceedings under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard-
proceedings that the concurring opinion called "pointless." 293
Whether or not D.S., S.E. G., or N.S. correctly interpreted ICWA, these cases demonstrate
how the Act's "beyond a reasonable doubt" test delays the removal of children from abusive or
neglectful families, and can even force the return of abused children to the very people who
abused them-simply because the evidence of abuse is "only" clear and convincing. As
Christine D. Bakeis observes, in a classic example of understatement, "[s]uch a result is clearly
not beneficial to children with Indian ancestry." 294
D. Foster, Pre-adoptive and Adoption Placement Preferences
1. Racial Categorization Harms Indian Children
When state courts review potential adoptions of Indian children, or consider placing them
in foster care (or what ICWA calls "pre-adoptive placement"), those courts must abide by a
hierarchy of race-based placement preferences set forth in the Act. In a foster or pre-adoptive
placement, a state court must place the child with members of the extended family (as defined by
291 Id. at 99.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 100 (Sabers, J., concurring).
294 Bakeis, supra note 98, at 551. See also KENNEDY, supra note 29, at 517 (the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
requirement of ICWA "on balance harms [Indian children] by making it too difficult to remove them from the
hellish conditions that confront all too many youngsters who languish helplessly behind the closed doors of their
homes.").
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tribal custom295); if none are available, with a foster home approved or specified by the tribe; if
none are available, with an Indian foster home approved by a non-Indian authority; and, again, if
none are available, with an institution approved by an Indian tribe or an Indian organization. 296
In adoption cases, the court must give preference first to a member of the child's extended family
(as defined by the tribe); second, to other members of the child's tribe; and, lastly, to "other
Indian families." 297
These placement preferences are based on race, not on political or tribal affiliation. 298
The foster care preferences mandate that a child be sent to "an Indian" foster facility approved
by "an Indian tribe"-not the child's own tribe-and the adoption preference hierarchy gives
preference to "other Indian families" over non-Indians who wish to adopt, even if those families
are of a different tribe.299 It is thus not tribal membership that matters, but generic Indianness.
As if that were not enough, the federal Multi-Ethnic Placement Act forbids the denial or delay of
an adoption or custody proceeding on the basis of race-but it specifically excludes one group of
children from this protection: Indian children.300
Ranking would-be foster and adoptive families in terms of ancestry rather than in terms
of the children's best interests is bound to cause problems, and severe problems have indeed
295 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (2012).
2 96 1d. § 1915(b).
2 971 d. § 1915(a).
298 Even if they did break down on tribal lines, they would likely constitute national-origin discrimination. See
generally Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1998).
299 See, e.g., In re K.B., 173 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1290 (2009) (approving custody despite the fact that children were
Choctaw and adoptive father was Cherokee); Dep't. of Hum. Servs. v. W.H.F., 254 Or. App. 298, 300-01 (2012)
(approving adoption because "[t]he potential adoptive father is an Indian tribal member, although not of the same
tribe."). InIn re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 81 (Mont. 1990), the Montana Supreme Court upheld a trial court's finding that
good cause existed to deviate from ICWA, but concluded that the state had "made a good faith attempt to comply
with the recommended preferential treatment" by placing the child "with an Indian foster mother," even though she
was of Plains Indian heritage-an entirely different tribe. The dissenting justice found it "improper and somewhat
patronizing" to assume that one tribe was essentially as good as another. Id. at 83 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
300 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b)(3) (2012).
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resulted. Shortly after their birth in 2010, Laurynn Whiteshield and her twin sister Michaela
were removed from their parents and placed with a non-Indian foster family in Bismarck, North
Dakota. 301 When county officials sought to terminate parental rights, however, the Spirit Lake
Sioux tribe invoked ICWA and had the case transferred to tribal court, which ordered that the
children be placed with their grandfather, Freeman Whiteshield, on the Spirit Lake Reservation,
despite the fact that Freeman's wife, Hope Whiteshield, had a record of child neglect charges. 302
A month later, Hope grew angry at the twins while they were playing outside, and threw them
down an embankment. 303 Laurynn died from the head trauma, and Hope was sentenced to thirty
years in prison.304 Michaela was returned to the custody of the non-Indian family from whom
she had originally been taken.305
Even where there is no such abuse, ICWA's foster and adoption preference scheme
imposes unnecessary suffering on children who are denied stability and sometimes taken away
from homes where they feel safe and loved. This often happens in ways that do not even
preserve tribal cultural integrity.
That was true in the case involving Lexi, the six-year-old Choctaw girl in California who
was removed from the foster family where she had lived for four years and sent to live with her
father's step-second cousins in Utah.306 Lexi (short for Alexandria) was born in December,
2009, to a mother addicted to methamphetamine, who had lost custody of at least six children
301 See Flatten, supra note 223, at 3.
3 02 Id. at 29.
303Id.
304Id.
305 Id. On June 3, 2016, President Obama signed the Native American Children's Safety Act, Pub. Law No. 114-165,
which requires criminal background checks for foster parents in cases involving tribal social services agencies.
306 To be precise, the Utah family consisted of distant cousins by marriage: Ginger R., whose uncle had been married
to Lexi's late grandmother, and Ginger R.'s husband. Neither were related by blood to Lexi. In re Alexandria P., 1
Cal. App. 5th 331, 340 (2016).
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before Lexi's birth.307 Her father had an extensive criminal history.308 He had no cultural ties to
the Choctaw tribe and was not aware that he was an enrolled member of the tribe until after
Lexi's placement in foster care. 309 Nevertheless, Lexi was subject to ICWA. For four years, she
thrived in the Pages' care, came to call them "mommy" and "daddy," and to regard their other
children as her siblings. California courts deemed the Pages her "de facto parents."310 The
"active efforts" to reunify Lexi with her father collapsed in 2012 when the father, having been
released from prison, decided he was no longer interested in reunification. 311 At that point, the
tribe deemed Lexi's step-second cousins to be "extended family" thanks to their relationship to
Lexi's deceased grandmother. 312 The step-second cousins, however, had no Native ancestry, and
were not tribal members. Nor was there any evidence that they were culturally Choctaw or that
placing Lexi with them would ensure that she was exposed to Choctaw tradition. 313
The Pages, wishing to adopt Lexi, urged the court to find "good cause" to deviate from
ICWA's placement preferences. Nobody disputed that the Pages were outstanding parents.
Rather, the "good cause" hearing focused on the psychological trauma Lexi would experience if
she were removed from their care. Although witnesses testified that she had a strong bond with
the Pages and would suffer great distress at being separated from them, the trial court
nevertheless ordered her removal because the testimony "did not reach to the level of certainty
3 071 In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal.App.4th at 1329-30.
3 08 Id. at 1328.
309 Petition for Certiorari, R.P. & S.P. v. Los Angeles Dep't of Child Welfare, et al. (No. 16-500) at 4-514 (on file
with Goldwater Institute).
3 10 In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal. App. 4th at 1330-34.
311 Id. at 1331.
312 Id. at 1331-32.
313 To be precise, the court of appeal concluded that because Lexi's late grandmother had "shar[ed] stories" with her
step-niece, and because that step-niece had grown up "in a community with many ties to Native American culture,"
there was "sufficient [evidence] to support a reasonable inference" that Lexi would have "access to her cultural
identity" in the custody of that step-niece. In re Alexandria P., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 639 (Ct. App. 2016).
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that Alexandria would suffer extreme detriment." 314 It found that Lexi would likely recover
from the trauma of being removed from the Pages, and that the extent of her bond with them did
not supersede ICWA's placement mandates. 315
The Court of Appeal reversed, admonishing the trial court for requiring definitive
certainty of psychological damage before deviating from ICWA,316 and instructing the trial court
to consider Lexi's individual best interests 317 and the extent of her bond with the Pages. 318 After
contentious efforts to obtain evidence, the trial court, in November of 2015, ordered Lexi
removed and placed with the Utah family. 319 The Court of Appeal promptly vacated that order
on the grounds that the trial court had not complied with the terms of remand. 320 Four months
later, the trial court held another hearing-although it refused to receive new evidence-and
again ruled against the Pages. 321 On the morning of Sunday, March 20, 2016, Lexi was taken
from Pages and driven away to Utah. The suffering inflicted by separating Lexi from the Pages'
stable and loving home after four years can only have been extreme.322
314 228 Cal. App. 4th at 1336, 1352.
315 Id. at 1354.
316Id. at 1353-54.
3 17 Id. at 1355-57.
3 1 81d. at 1337.
319 R.P. v. Superior Court, No. B268111, 2015 WL 7572569 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015).
3 20 Id. at *1.
321 In re Alexandria P., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 623 (Ct. App. 2016).
322 Fewer than 10 percent of foster children remain in foster care for four years. See Child Welfare Information
Gateway, Foster Care Statistics 2014 at 7, https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/foster.pdf. It goes without
saying that children in foster care who experience repeated separations often suffer emotional and psychological
strain, leading to problems with identity, stability, and fears of intimacy, and are at greater risk for delinquency. See
generally BENJAMIN KERMAN, ET AL., EDS., ACHIEVING PERMANENCE FOR OLDER CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN FOSTER
CARE (2009); Gina Miranda Samuels, Ambiguous Loss ofHome: The Experience ofFamilial (Im)permanence
Among Young Adults with Foster Care Backgrounds, 31 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERV. REV. 1229 (2009); Mark E.
Courtney & Darcy Hughes Heuring, The Transition to Adulthoodfor Youth "Aging Out" ofthe Foster Care System,
in D.W. OSGOOD, ET AL., EDS., ON YOUR OWN WITHOUT A NET 68-91 (2005); Jimmy Mosqueda & Jennifer
Rodriguez, Voices Carry: Recommendations of Young People in the Foster Care System 10-12 (California Youth
Connection Policy Conference Report 2005); Joseph P. Ryan & Mark F. Testa, Child Maltreatment and Juvenile
Delinquency: Investigating the Role ofPlacement and Placement Instability 27 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV.
227 (2005); Virginia L. Colin, Infant Attachment: What We Know Now at ii (U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
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The Pages appealed, arguing that the removal was contrary to Lexi's best interests, but
the California Court of Appeal affirmed.323 It did not refuse outright to apply the best interests
standard, but purported to apply a different kind of best interests standard. "When the best
interests of an Indian child are being considered," it declared, courts "should take an Indian
child's best interests into account as one of the constellation offactors."324 For children of other
races, of course, the child's best interest is the overriding consideration, and in cases in which
children have spent long periods in foster care, California courts typically regard the child's need
for stability as the deciding factor.325 Not so for Indian children. "When the best interests of an
Indian child are being considered," the court declared, "the importance of preserving the child's .
. . cultural connections often cannot be separated from other factors." 326 This statement makes
no sense. Lexi had no cultural connection to the Choctaw tribe; her only connection to the tribe
was biological. It was on account of her biological ancestry that she was classified as an "Indian
child" under ICWA and, consequently, the court viewed her individual interests as only one of a
"constellation" of factors by which her future would be determined.
1991) ("The importance of early infant attachment cannot be overstated. It is at the heart of healthy child
development and lays the foundation for relating intimately with others, including spouses and children.").
"Given the potential long-term effects that lack of attachment can have on a child, it is crucial that the
foster care system respond in ways that help the child develop attachments with their primary caregivers whomever
they may be. No matter if the plan for a child in interim care is reunification ... or a move into an adoptive home. .
. the development of an attachment to foster parents should be encouraged. Children need ongoing relationships to
continue their growth and change." VERA FAHLBERG, A CHILD'S JOURNEY THROUGH PLACEMENT 23-24 (1991).
323 In re Alexandria P., 1 Cal. App. 5th 331 (2016), cert. denied, 2017 WL 69720 (Jan 09, 2017) (No. 16-500).
32 Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
325 See, e.g., In re Nia A., 246 Cal. App. 4th 1241, 1248 (2016) ("the law indisputably directs that the paramount
consideration is whether the proposed transfer will serve the child's best interest."); In re Guardianship of Ann S.,
45 Cal. 4th 1110, 1136 n. 19 (2009) ("the child's best interest becomes the paramount consideration after an
extended period of foster care."); In re Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th 295, 317 (1994) ("In any custody determination, a
primary consideration in determining the child's best interest is the goal of assuring stability and continuity. When
custody continues over a significant period, the child's need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly
important role. That need will often dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in
the best interests of that child.") (citation and quotation marks omitted).
326 In re Alexandria P., 1 Cal. App. 5th at 351 (emphasis added).
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As the Whiteshield and Lexi cases, and countless others, demonstrate, ICWA prioritizes
ethnic criteria above the individualized consideration of a child's best interests-to the detriment
of children and the adults who love them.
2. ICWA's Foster And Adoption Preferences Deprive Indian Children of Due Process,
Equal Protection, And Freedom of Association Rights
ICWA's placement preferences deprive Indian children of their rights to due process,
equal protection, and freedom of association. One of the most basic elements of due process of
law 327 is that courts must address the specific facts of a case, 32 8 and issue individualized
judgments rather than impose blanket assumptions premised on a person's race, national origin,
or other "immutable characteristic[s] determined solely by the accident of birth." 329 Yet in an
ICWA case, the most crucial factor-virtually the deciding factor-is the child's biologically-
determined Indian status. ICWA's race-based foster and adoption preferences deprive children
of the individualized consideration inherent in due process, and because these preferences result
in treating them differently than other children exclusively on account of their racial or national
origin, these preferences also deprive Indian children of the equal protection of the law.
ICWA's preferences also violate the freedom of association. Tribal membership and
family relationships are both forms of association protected by the First Amendment.330 The
327 Minors have the right under the Due Process Clause to fundamentally fair judicial proceedings. In re Application
of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1967).
328 See, e.g., Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549-50 (3d Cir. 2001); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 644-45 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
329 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
330 Cf Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (freedom of association especially protects
family association, because the "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships" are an
essential "individual freedom. . . [and] central to our constitutional scheme."); United States v. Crook, 25 F. Cas.
695, 699 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879) ("the individual Indian possesses the clear and God-given right to withdraw from his
tribe and forever live away from it.").
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right to associate includes the right not to associate. 331 Minors have First Amendment rights,
including the right not to associate. 332 Yet ICWA tries to force the formation of tribal and even
familial bonds by essentially compelling children to join Indian families based on their biological
ancestry, irrespective of their individual best interests. BIA regulations even require state
officers to enroll children in tribes if they are not already enrolled.333 Thus even putting aside the
question of whether ICWA establishes a political or a racial classification, 334 the Act's placement
preferences are unconstitutional.
The First Amendment forbids government from forcing people to join political
associations, 335 make political statements, 336 or pledge allegiance to the government. 337 But
ICWA seeks to force one specific class of American citizens to obtain formal membership in a
political unit that enjoys attributes of sovereignty. Tribal membership is not ordinary dual
citizenship, of course, given the "unique and limited" 338 nature of tribal sovereignty, but tribal
membership significantly changes the legal regime that applies to a person,339 because it
"denotes an association with the [tribal] polity" and imposes an "unequivocal legal bond." 340 A
331 California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).
332 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
333 Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10153, B.4(d)(iii).
334 See infra, Section III.A.
335 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 233-36 (1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-57
(1976).
336 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986). In addition to compulsory membership intruding on the First Amendment, being forced to
join an Indian tribe also interferes with the First Amendment right against compulsory speech. Unlike unions or bar
associations, tribes are not prohibited from using their resources for political lobbying, and unlike states, they are not
barred from using resources to endorse official religions. See, e.g., Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo Tribal
Council, 272 F.2d 131, 135 (10th Cir. 1959). Being compelled to join a tribe therefore inherently includes being
compelled to engage in speech, including religious speech, and association.
337 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
338 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
339 See DUTHU, supra note 28, at 138 ("As domestic dual citizens, American Indian members of federally recognized
tribes are heirs to the American legal tradition ... as well as their own tribal systems .... [T]here is clearly a
tension between the two.").
340 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979).
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person with dual nationality can be "subject to claims from both nations, claims which at times
may be competing or conflicting." 341 The government may not force one group of citizens,
defined by ancestry, to obtain citizenship from another sovereign and thereby submit to a change
in their legal rights and obligations.
Even more intrusively, ICWA seeks to create Indian families through its preferences as
well as through its "active efforts" provision. Freedom of association, a fundamental aspect of
individual liberty, includes family relationships, because these are intimate and "involve deep
attachments and commitments" to those "few" others with whom one shares "a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs" and the "distinctively personal aspects of one's
life." 342 Yet ICWA tries to force the formation of family bonds by mandating adoption of Indian
children by "other Indian families," and also obstructs the formation of consensual family bonds
between Indian children and non-Indian adoptive families. The decision to form a family is
entitled to legal protection, 343 yet ICWA can negate that choice even where birth parents and fit
adoptive families (and even children themselves 344) would prefer to form an adoptive family
outside the racial categories ICWA imposes.
341 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 733 (1952). Tribal members are subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction in
ways that non-members are not, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978), and can be
taxed by tribes in ways non-members cannot be. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 649-51 (2001).
Tribal governments are exempt from many of the constitutional rules that protect people against other forms of
government in the United States. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 (1978) (Indian Civil
Rights Act "does not prohibit the establishment of religion, nor does it require jury trials in civil cases, or
appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal cases."). And the legal remedies available when tribes deprive
members of their federal constitutional rights are far narrower than those available when states violate the rights of
citizens. Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 366 F.3d 89, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2004).
342 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
343 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597-98 (2015).
3 1 See Barbara Atwood, The Voice of the Indian Child: Strengthening the Indian Child Welfare Act Through
Children'sParticipation, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 127, 137 (2008) (although ICWA includes consideration of the child's
wishes in placement determinations, "[t!he opaque statutory reference and the [BIA] Guidelines together leave
courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a particular Indian child's request should be a significant factor in
the placement decision."). Cf In re S.L., 2006 WL 477772, **5, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (remanding a termination
case for compliance with ICWA despite child's expressed wishes to the contrary).
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Consider, for instance, In re Adoption ofJ.R.D., which involved a Cherokee mother
and a non-Indian father who separated in 2006 after two years of marriage. In 2008, the mother
ended visits between the father and child because of the father's drug use.346 Two years after
that, she remarried, again to a non-Indian, who sought to adopt her child legally-whereupon the
tribe intervened pursuant to ICWA to block the adoption. 347 Against the will of the Indian
mother, and despite evidence that the birth father "did not want a parental relationship with [the]
Child," 348 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals denied the adoption and ordered that the birth father
be granted custody.349 For the state to interfere with people's decision to create families through
adoption-simply because of their race-violates their First Amendment freedom of association
rights.
III.
RACIAL OR POLITICAL IDENTITY
"'Really, a baby elephant should be raised by elephants.'
"'She isn't an elephant. She's a little girl.
-Barbara Kingsolver 350
"'Is a cat a man, Huck?'
"'No.'. . .
"'Is a cow a man?-er is a cow a cat?'
"'No, she ain't either of them'. . . ."
"'Is a Frenchman a man?'
"'Yes."'
-Mark Twain 35 1
A. Is ICWA's Differential Treatment Based on Race or Politics?
345 (Okla. Civ. App. No. 113,228) (unpublished) (Apr. 21, 2015) (on file with Goldwater Institute).
34 6 Id. at 3.
347 Id. at 4.
348 Id. at 11.
34 9 Id. at 12.
350 BARBARA KINGSOLVER, PIGS IN HEAVEN 279 (1993).
351 MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 114 (Clayton, Del.: Prestwick House, 2005) (1884).
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ICWA obviously treats Indian children and families differently from non-Indian children
and families. Whether this is constitutional or not depends on whether it is regarded as race-
based or as based on the nature of tribes as political units. In the former case, the distinction
would be regarded as suspect, and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, which it certainly could
not survive. But if the distinction is based on political identity rather than race, it is only subject
to lenient rational basis review.
In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a law that gave
preference to Indian tribal members in hiring for positions with the BIA.352 That preference was
"political rather than racial in nature," the Court held, and therefore did not trigger strict scrutiny,
because it "applie[d] only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes," and was "not directed
towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians.' 353 Three years later, in United States v.
Antelope, 354 the Court relied on Mancari when it upheld a conviction under a criminal statute
that differentiated between Indians and non-Indians. As before, the Court ruled that the statute
was not based on the fact that a person was "racially to be classified as 'Indian[].' 355 Instead,
the parties involved were enrolled members of a tribe, and had committed a crime in Indian
country. Thus although Mancari is frequently cited as standing for the proposition that all laws
that treat Indians differently from non-Indians are subject to the forgiving standard of rational
basis scrutiny-an argument Justice Sonya Sotomayor made in her dissent in Adoptive
Couple356 -Mancari is actually far narrower than that.
352 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
3 5 3 Id. at 553 n.24.
354 430 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1977).
355 Id. at 647 n.7.
356 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2554, 2584 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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The Ninth Circuit examined Mancari's limits in Williams v. Babbitt, which involved an
Alaska statute that, according to a state administrative interpretation, forbade the sale of reindeer
to anyone other than a Native Alaskan. 357 When business owners seeking to import reindeer for
husbandry and sale challenged the constitutionality of this restriction, the state argued that it was
subject only to rational basis scrutiny under Mancari.358 The court disagreed. Where the
preference in Mancari was limited to the BIA-which is uniquely tasked with serving the needs
of Indians-Alaska's restriction on reindeer sales "provides a preference in an industry that is
not uniquely native . .. [and which] in no way relates to native land, tribal or communal status,
or culture." 359 Instead, it simply established a business monopoly for Native Alaskans, without
regard to "whether the beneficiaries live in a remote native village on the Seward Peninsula or in
downtown Anchorage." 360 When a law "relates to Indian land, tribal status, self-government or
culture," it is subject to rational-basis scrutiny under Mancari because it relates to the "unique
status of Indians as a separate people . .. [with] a right to expect some special protection for their
land, political institutions ... and culture." 361 But when a law does not relate exclusively to
"uniquely Indian interests," 362 a distinction between Indian and non-Indian implicates the
Constitution's ban on racial discrimination.
Not long after the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the Supreme Court applied a similarly narrow
reading of Mancari in Rice v. Cayetano.363 That case involved a Hawaii law whereby only
357 115 F.3d 657 (1997). See also Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 868 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003);
Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting broad reading of Mancari).
35' Babbitt, 115 F.3d at 663-65.
3 59 Id. at 664.
360 Id.
361 Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
362 Id. at 665.
363 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
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Native Hawaiians could vote for officials of the state's Office of Native Hawaiian Affairs. 364 it
employed a blood quantum requirement among other factors to determine eligibility.365 The state
relied on Mancari to argue that this distinction was political, instead of racial, but the Court
disagreed.366 Mancari and its progeny involved laws that singled out "'a constituency of tribal
Indians,"' not "a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians,"' said the Court.367 The Hawaii law, by
contrast, "single[d] out 'identifiable classes of persons ... solely because of their ancestry or
ethnic characteristics. '368 State law even defined the term "Native Hawaiian" as "any
descendant of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to
[European contact] ... [or] to the descendants of such blood quantum of such aboriginal
peoples." 369 This definition involved factors other than race, but that did not mean it was not a
racial classification. 370
ICWA plainly falls outside the bounds of Mancari.371 It applies not to members of tribes,
but to children who are both eligible for membership and biological children of members. 372
Eligibility for tribal membership universally depends on biological ancestry. 373 It follows
364 Id. at 498-99.
365 Id. at 510.
3 66 Id. at 518-22.
367 Id. at 519 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.4).
368 Id. at 515 (quoting Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)).
369 Id. at 516 (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (1993)).
3 70 Id. at 516-17.
371 Courts addressing ICWA's constitutionality of often been content simply to cite Mancari or similar cases,
without seriously weighing its applicability. For instance, in In re D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D.
1980), the South Dakota Supreme Court summarily rejected an equal protection challenge to ICWA with the
conclusory assertion that ICWA is "based solely upon the political status of the parents and children and the quasi-
sovereign nature of the tribe." That case, however, involved children who were both tribal members and
domiciliaries of the reservation.
372 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3), (4) (2012). ICWA does apply to children who are tribal members, but as membership
requires eligibility, the determinative factor is still eligibility, which is based on biology.
373 Even tribes like the Cherokee or Choctaw that impose no specific blood quantum still require lineal biological
descent from signers of Native censuses. See, e.g., CHEROKEE CONST. art. IV § 1; CHOCTAW CONST. art. II, § 1.
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syllogistically that ICWA applies to a racial group consisting of Indians.374 True, factors other
than biology also count, so that not all children of Native American ancestry are included within
the class, but that was also true of the law at issue in Rice. "Simply because a class defined by
ancestry does not include all members of the race does not suffice to make the classification race
neutral."375
ICWA's racial nature is reinforced in various other ways. For example, recent BIA
regulations and some state laws apply ICWA based on a child being suspected of Indian
ancestry, even before tribal status is determined,376 and require state officials to register children
for tribal membership if they are eligible.377 ICWA also applies only to children who are both
eligible for tribal membership and who are the biological children of members, meaning that a
non-Native child adopted by a tribal member is not subject to ICWA, regardless of cultural or
political affiliation. Thus, for instance, Sam Houston-an adopted member of the Cherokee
tribe378 -or Linda Wishkob-the fictional adoptee who plays a critical role in Louise Erdrich's
374 Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 23 (2008).
375 Rice, 528 U.S. at 516-17. A racial category does not cease to be a racial category just because factors other than
race play a role in defining the class. After all, the executive order forcing Japanese Americans into detention
centers in World War II applied only to persons with more than one-sixteenth Japanese ancestry. See WENDY NG,
JAPANESE INTERNMENT DURING WORLD WAR II: A HISTORY AND REFERENCE GUIDE 37 (2002). Even persons with
more than this amount of Japanese ancestry could leave detention centers if they enlisted in the military or obtained
sponsorship. See BENSON TONG, ASIAN-AMERICAN CHILDREN: A HISTORICAL HANDBOOK AND GUIDE 95 (2004).
But the fact that not all persons of Japanese heritage were subject to the order did not make that order anything other
than a race-based rule subject to strict scrutiny. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The law is
clear: if race is a but-for factor in the calculus, that calculus is race-based, regardless of the role other factors may
play.
376 See Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 14887, 23.103(d) (ICWA applies "[i]f there is any reason to believe the child is
an Indian child ... unless and until it is determined that the child is not a member or is not eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe."); In re Jack C., III, 192 Cal. App. 4th 967, 981 (2011) (upholding state court rule requiring courts
to proceed under ICWA before a child's tribal membership is determined).
377 Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 14893, 23.134(b), (c).
378 See MARQUIS JAMES, THE RAVEN: A BIOGRAPHY OF SAM HOUSTON 20 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004)
(1929). Houston, adopted at the age of 16 in 1809 by Chief Oo-loo-te-ka, was named Colonneh, or The Raven, in
Cherokee. Under today's Cherokee Constitution, Houston would be ineligible for membership in the tribe, since he
obviously had no ancestor who signed the Dawes Rolls. Nor was he the biological child of a tribal member. He
therefore could not qualify as an "Indian child" under ICWA despite his cultural affiliation with the tribe.
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novel The RoundHouse379 -would not have been subject to ICWA despite their complete
cultural and social affiliation with their tribes, whereas Lexi was subject to ICWA, despite
lacking any cultural or social connections to a tribe. The deciding factor is genetic. Also, other
provisions of ICWA, such as the adoption preference granted to "other Indian families" and the
foster-care preferences for "an Indian foster home," expressly apply to the "Indian" race in the
abstract, rather than to tribes as specific political entities. Thanks to these provisions, an Alaskan
child of Eskimo heritage could be placed with an unrelated member of a Plains Indian tribe in
Montana, rather than with a fit, or even fitter, adoptive family of a different race-again, not
because of political affiliation, but because of their "Indianness." 380 The ICWA Penalty Box
depends not on membership in a political organization, but on the ethnic quality of being
Indian. 38 1
Race was at the forefront of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Adoptive Couple,
which involved a child (known as "Baby Veronica") whose Cherokee father had surrendered his
parental rights before her birth and who had never even met her.382 The mother volunteered
379 See LOUISE ERDRICH, THE ROUND HOUSE 114 (2012). In the novel, Linda, a white child born with birth defects,
is abandoned by her birth parents and taken in by members of the Ojibwe tribe. Under that tribe's Constitution,
Linda would not be eligible for membership, because membership requires biological Chippewa ancestry. See
MINN. CHIPPEWA TRIBE CONST. art. 11 (1964). Nor is she a biological child of a tribal member, as required by 25
U.S.C. § 1903(4)(b).
380 Cf In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 83 (Mont. 1990) (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for the "patronizing"
assumption that ICWA was satisfied by placing Eskimo child with family of Plains ancestry).
381 See also Maldonado, supra note 380, at 25 ("Under ICWA, all Indian families, other than members of the child's
tribe, are treated equally regardless of cultural, political, economic, or religious differences between the tribes, or the
fact that there are over 250 different tribal languages. Further, ICWA makes no distinction between 'local' tribes
and those located thousands of miles from the child's tribe."); Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1373, 1381-82 (2002) (acknowledging that these provisions of ICWA establish "racialized preferences.");
Shawn L. Murphy, The Supreme Court's Revitalization of the Dying "Existing Indian Family" Exception, 46
McGEORGE L. REV. 629, 640 (2014) ("The legal fiction that 'Indian' is a political affiliation and not a racial
category is further discredited in that Indian tribes do not enroll members on the basis of member agreement with the
politics of the tribe, but on the basis of blood quantum and familial ancestry.").
382 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558-59 (2013).
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Veronica for adoption by a non-Indian family.383 After her birth, the father withdrew his
consent, and two years later, the South Carolina Supreme Court awarded him custody-all based
solely on the fact that Veronica had Cherokee blood in her veins.384 The Supreme Court found
this improper. Although it resolved the case on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, it
observed that allowing the father to "play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override
the mother's decision and the child's best interests . . . solely because an ancestor-even a
remote one-was an Indian . . . would raise equal protection concerns." 385
In one ongoing case, attorneys for the federal government have argued that ICWA does
not establish a racial category, but rather that the law uses blood descent "as a shorthand for the
social, cultural, and communal ties a person has with a sovereign tribal entity." 386 But using a
person's ethnic heritage as a "shorthand" for her cultural and political affiliations is the very
definition of racial discrimination. That, after all, is precisely what occurred when the federal
government ordered Americans of Japanese ancestry to report to detention centers during World
War II.387 That was nevertheless a racial categorization subject to strict scrutiny. 388
B. The Existing Indian Family Doctrine
State courts, wary of the equal protection problems caused by applying a different set of
laws to children based solely on their biological ancestry, have sometimes declined to apply
383 Id.
384 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 398 S.C. 625, 655 (2012) ("in transferring custody to Father ... Baby Girl's
familial and tribal ties may be established ... in furtherance of the clear purpose of the ICWA, which is to preserve
American Indian culture by retaining its children within the tribe." (emphasis added)).
38 5 Id. at 2565.
386 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, A.D., et al., v. Washburn, et al. (D. Ariz. No. 2:15-cv-01259) (Oct. 16, 2015) at
23 (on file with Goldwater Institute).
387 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
388 Id. at 216. Korematsu was the first case in which the Supreme Court employed strict scrutiny for racial
classifications.
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ICWA in cases involving children whose only connection to a tribe is biological. In doing so,
they have fashioned an exception to ICWA known as the Existing Indian Family Doctrine. 389
The Doctrine, however, has been heavily criticized, and the current trend is to abandon it.
The Doctrine was first employed by the Kansas Supreme Court in In re Baby Boy L.,390
which involved a child bom to an unmarried non-Indian mother and a father who was a member
of the Kiowa tribe and was incarcerated when the child was bom. The mother consented to
having him adopted. 391 But after he was bom, the father asserted rights under ICWA, and-over
the mother's objection-the child was enrolled in the tribe. 392 The trial court found that ICWA
did not apply, and the state Supreme Court agreed. ICWA was intended to maintain "the family
and tribal relationships existing in Indian homes," the Court held, "not to dictate that an
illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an Indian home or culture, and probably
never would be, should be removed from its primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian
environment over the express objections of its non-Indian mother." 393 To apply ICWA in such a
case "would be to violate the policy and intent of Congress rather than uphold them." 394
After Baby Boy L., several other state courts adopted the Existing Indian Family
Doctrine, holding that ICWA simply did not apply to cases in which the child's only connection
to a tribe was biological.395 Among the most prominent decisions applying the Doctrine were In
re Bridget R. and In re Santos Y., from the California Court of Appeal. In Bridget R., the court
389 See generally Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D.
L. REV. 465 (1993).
390 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
391 Id. at 173.
392 Id.
3 93 Id. at 175.
394 Id.
395 See, e.g., In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274 (2001); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Ky. 1996); In re
S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
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declined to apply ICWA to a case involving two-year-old Indian twins who had been
relinquished for adoption at birth.396 The birth parents later tried to rescind consent, which
ICWA allows, but the court refused, holding that ICWA did not apply. 397 "[T]here are
significant constitutional impediments," it found, to using ICWA in cases involving "persons
who are not residents or domiciliaries of an Indian reservation, are not socially or culturally
connected with an Indian community, and, in all respects except genetic heritage, are
indistinguishable from other residents of the state." 398 To do so would be to impose an
unconstitutional racial distinction. Instead, there must be "social, cultural or political
relationships between Indian children and their tribes" before ICWA's differential treatment of
Indian children could qualify as a Mancari-type political distinction.399
Writers harshly criticized Bridget R. on the grounds that the court was "determin[ing] if
the member acts American Indian enough to appease their perception of what an American
Indian should do or be," and was putting courts in charge of deciding who is and is not an
Indian. 400 Such criticism is misguided. First, it fails to distinguish between Indian tribal
membership, which is solely a matter of tribal law, and "Indian child" status under ICWA-
396 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1523 (1996).
3 97 Id. at 1521-22.
3 98 Id. at 1501.
3 99 Id. at 1508.
400 Cheyafina L. Jaffke, The "Existing Indian Family" Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act: The States'
Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Indian Children, 66 LA. L. REV. 733, 748 (2006). See also Marcia A. Zug,
The Real Impact ofAdoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: The Existing Indian Family Doctrine Is Not Affirmed, but the
Future of the ICWA's Placement Preferences Is Jeopardized, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 327, 329-38 (2014); Lorie M.
Graham, "The Past Never Vanishes": A Contextual Critique of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 1, 39-43 (1998); Aliza G. Organick, Holding Back The Tide: The Existing Indian Family Doctrine and Its
Continued Denial of the Right to Culture for Indigenous Children, in FLETCHER, ET AL., supra note 51, at 221; Dan
Lewerenz & Padraic McCoy, The End of "Existing Indian Family" Jurisprudence: Holyfield at 20, In the Matter of
A.JS., and the Last Gasps ofa Dying Doctrine, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 684, 715-17 (2010); Suzianne D.
Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the "Existing Indian Family" Exception
(Re)Imposes Anglo American Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329, 376 (2009); Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children 's Rights and Civil
Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 161-66 (2004).
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which is a matter of federal and state law, and thus subject to the requirement of equal
protection. 401 While it is correct that federal and state courts generally have no role to play in
tribal determinations of membership criteria, 402 they are responsible for applying constitutional
standards to state and federal governments. Second, critics are right to detect a clash between
"liberal conceptions of parents' and children's individual rights, ideals of color-blind equality,
and a peculiarly American kind of liberty" on one hand,403 and, on the other hand, the racialist
assumption that children can be subjected to a separate legal regime exclusively as a
consequence of their biological ancestry. But there is nothing paternalistic or demeaning in the
way the Doctrine resolves that conflict. The Doctrine is premised on the notion that Indian
children, like all other American citizens, are individuals, entitled to equal treatment before the
law, and that political and legal status cannot be predicated on ethnic origin.
Critics are correct, however, in pointing out that the Doctrine has no basis in the text of
ICWA, which makes no mention of cultural affiliation in its definition of "Indian child." And
while courts are correct that something like the Doctrine is necessary if the application of ICWA
is to avoid conflict with equal protection, it is also true that inviting courts to determine how
much and what kind of cultural connection must exist does risk intrusion into questions of tribal
self-determination that ICWA sought to avoid.404 Critics are right that genuine sovereignty must
include the right to determine citizenship. But how that principle works in the ICWA context is
the problem.
401 Cf In re Abbigail A., 1 Cal. 5th 83, 95 (2016) (noting this distinction).
402 But see Vann v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 701 F.3d 927 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (allowing lawsuit challenging Cherokee
exclusion of "Cherokee Freedmen" from tribal membership to proceed).
403 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Are You My Mother?": Conceptualizing Children's Identity Rights in Transracial
Adoptions, 2 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 107, 108 (1995).
41 See, e.g., Graham, supra note 406, at 36 ("The Doctrine ... violates basic principles of tribal sovereignty. Native
American nations, as distinct political communities, have the authority to determine their own membership.").
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The California Legislature responded to Bridget R. by amending state law to define the
term "Indian child." 405 But while the new statutory language evidently disapproved of the
Bridget R. decision, that language was identical to the language in ICWA itself-language the
Bridget R. court was interpreting. This meant that when the court was called upon to address the
subject again in Santos Y., it reiterated its holding in support of the Existing Indian Family
Doctrine. 406 Today, the status of the Doctrine in California remains unsettled. Some Courts of
Appeal have rejected it,407 and the state Supreme Court has not resolved the conflict. 408 Many
other state courts have now abandoned the Doctrine, however, including the Kansas Supreme
Court.4 09
Yet in the long run, debate over the Doctrine misses the essential point. The Doctrine is
not an assault on ICWA. It is a saving construction designed to preserve a statute that would
otherwise run afoul of the Constitution's ban on racial discrimination. 410 To abandon the
Doctrine would only force courts to confront that prohibition directly, and that would involve
further conflict in high profile cases involving children whose sole connection to tribes is
biological. ICWA cannot survive that confrontation. The Constitution simply cannot abide a
405 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 360.6. This provision was later re-codified in CAL. FAM. CODE § 170.
406 In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1316-17 (2001).
407 In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1344 (2014); In re Vincent M., 150 Cal. App. 4th 1247, 1264
(2007); In re Adoption of Hannah S., 142 Cal. App. 4th 988, 995 (2006); In re Alicia S., 65 Cal. App. 4th 79, 88
(1998).
408 In 2006, the California Legislature adopted CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224, again purporting to negate the
Doctrine. That statute, however, declares only that "[i]t is in the interest of an Indian child that the child's
membership in the child's Indian tribe and connection to the tribal community be encouraged and protected,
regardless of whether the child is in the physical custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the
commencement of a child custody proceeding ... One Court of Appeal has declared that "there is no question"
that this put an end to the Doctrine in California, In re Autumn K., 221 Cal. App. 4th 674, 716 (2013), but the
California Supreme Court has not addressed the question.
409 in re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 549-50 (Kan. 2009). See also In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099, 1103-06 (Okl.
2004); Thompsonv. Fairfax Cty Dep't of Family Servs., 747 S.E.2d 838, 846-48 (Va. Ct. App. 2013); In re
Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989).
410 See, e.g., In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1492 (1996) ("[T]he existing Indian family doctrine is
necessary in a case such as this in order to preserve ICWA's constitutionality.")
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separate legal track for American citizens of a particular ethnicity. Nor can it empower another
sovereign, no matter how friendly, to assert unreviewable power to pluck American citizen
children out of state judicial systems and adjudicate their foster and adoption placements,
entirely on account of their biological ancestry. 411 Certainly no foreign power could do so. One
can hardly imagine, say, Japan granting Japanese citizenship to all Americans of Japanese
ancestry, and then ordering that civil or criminal proceedings involving them be transferred to
courts there.4 12
Commentators debate whether Adoptive Couple incorporated the Existing Indian Family
Doctrine. 413 Certainly its refusal to apply ICWA's "active efforts" provision where there is no
existing Indian family to be broken up suggests that the decision employs some version of the
Doctrine. But even if the Doctrine's critics prevail, abolishing it would only unveil ICWA's
racially discriminatory aspects.
IV.
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CHILD
" . . . all men are created equal. "
-Declaration of Independence 414
411 Such a prospect hearkens back to the doctrine of "natural allegiance" which held that a person born subject to the
crown had no power to give up his allegiance and become a citizen of another nation. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *357. This doctrine has long been considered anathema to the U.S. Constitution. Perez, 356 U.S.
at 66-67. It even formed the basis of the British policy of "impressment" in the nineteenth century, one of the
leading causes of the War of 1812. See generally David W. Maxey, Loss ofNationality: Individual Choice or
Government Fiat?, 26 ALB. L. REv. 151, 154, 160 (1962).
412 One early commentator analogized ICWA's jurisdictional provisions to the Soldier's and Sailor's Relief Act of
1940, 50 U.S.C. § 501, which suspended enforcement of civil proceedings against persons in active military service.
See Mary Lou Vanderpan, Note, In re D.L.L. & C.L.L., Minors: Ruling on the Constitutionality of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 26 S.D. L. REv. 67, 77 (1981). But that Act was an ordinary exercise of federal preemption, and
contained no racial or ethnic component.
413 Murphy, The Supreme Court's Revitalization, supra note 387, at 643.
4 14 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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"To be citizens on apar with others is to be defacto whites, to engage in a process not of
[Indigenous people 's] making, and so to have indigenous voices silenced and replaced by voices
borrowedfrom the other."
-Steven Curry415
In American Indians and The Law, Professor N. Bruce Duthu acknowledges that ICWA
cases "may appear on the social radar as instances in which group rights unfairly trump
individual rights." 416 But, he contends, viewing them this way would only demonstrate
"ignoran[ce]" or "hostil[ity]" toward tribal sovereignty and toward Indian culture and values.417
The principle of individual sovereignty that ultimately undergirds the best interests of the child
standard is only a "Western legal theory" that should not be foisted upon Native Americans. 418
Many other commentators on ICWA share this perspective. In their view, the idea that
the law should treat Indian children as individual citizens with basic rights antecedent to tribal
affiliation is a kind of cultural bias or even a form of racism. "A rights-focused analysis," writes
Jennifer Nutt Carleton, "is contrary to the provisions of ICWA." 419 Professor Michael Dale
describes the best interest of the child test as an "Anglo middle-class standard," which is
"decidedly different" from Indian values.4 2 0 "[T]he inclusion of the child's 'best interests"' in
ICWA cases, writes Professor Annett Ruth Appell, "reveal[s] the tenacity of cultural
hegemony." 421 Professor Lorie Graham calls the principle underlying the Existing Indian Family
Doctrine-that judges should regard children as individuals with rights, rather than as fungible
members of a separate class-"offensive" because it disregards both the child's "unique
415 STEVEN CURRY, INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROJECT 99 (2004).
416 DUTHU, supra note 28, at 155.
4 17 Id.
4 1 81 d. at 140.
419 Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study in the Codification of the Ethnic Best Interests of
the Child, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 37 (1997).
420 Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Unstated Best Interest of
the Child Test, 27 GONz. L. REV. 353, 370, 372 (1991).
421 Appell, supra note 406 at 161-66.
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symbiotic relationship" with the tribe and the child's "potential relationship . . . to the kinship
community."422 Perhaps most succinctly, the Texas Court of Appeals declared in 1995 that using
the best interest of the child standard in ICWA cases "defeats the [law's] very purpose," because
it "allows Anglo cultural biases into the picture."423
This is dangerously wrongheaded. It is true, as these critics claim, that the best interests
of the child standard, as well as the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, reflect a cultural norm.
That cultural norm is the proposition that all people deserve equal treatment before the law,
regardless of race. This principle lies at the heart of the American constitutional order. It forms
the basis of the Declaration of Independence and of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, with
their protections for due process of law and equal protection of the laws. 424 The best interests
standard and Existing Indian Family Doctrine manifest this principle because they are inherently
individualized, focus on the specific needs of the particular child whose welfare is at issue in the
case at hand, and treat the child as a person first, and as an Indian only secondarily.
This cultural norm is in no sense a distinctively "Anglo" or white cultural attitude. On
the contrary, it is a universal principle based on human values.425 The propositions that all
people-including Indians-are born free and equal, and that their fundamental rights must take
precedence over the claims of any collective or state, do not depend on the culture of the person
involved. They are true of all people, everywhere, at all times. In fact, these propositions did
422 Graham, supra note 406, at 39-40.
423 Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 170 (Tex. App. 1995).
4 2 See generally TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY (2014).
425 See generally HARRY V. JAFFA, HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Claremont, CA: Claremont
Institute Press, 1999) (1978); INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS RECONSIDERED: ARE THE TRUTHS OF THE U.S. DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE LASTING? (Tibor R. Machan, ed., 2001); DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN DEFENSE OF EQUALITY (2014).
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not originate with Anglo-Americans. Their first appearance in the modem west426 came,
fittingly enough, in relation to the Indians of the Western Hemisphere, more than two centuries
before the American Revolution, in the writings and activism of the Spanish priest Bartolem6 de
Las Casas. 427 He argued-most notably in his 1550 debates in Valladolid-against the
enslavement and brutality meted out by Spanish imperialists in the New World, and insisted that
Indians were equal human beings entitled to justice. "They are inferior to none," he proclaimed.
"Those they equal are the Greeks and Romans." 428 Indians were rational beings, with a lively
civilization, fully as capable of arts and sciences as other people, and possessed of individual
rights that ought to be respected. "[T]here is no natural difference in the creation of men," he
wrote-and thus no basis for according Indians lesser legal protections than those that apply to
non-Indians. 429
It is the universality of the principles of individualism and equality that makes these ideas
so revolutionary. That is why these principles could be deployed in defense of women,430 of
African slaves, 431 of Chinese and Japanese immigrants, 432 and, of course, in defense of
Indians. 433 And it is why enemies of human rights have so often tried to characterize these
426 The principle of universal human equality can, of course, be found in the Hebrew Bible, the writings of ancient
Roman philosophers, and even the Greeks. None of these were "Anglos."4 27 See generally LAWRENCE A. CLAYTON, BARTOLOMt DE LAS CASAS: A BIOGRAPHY (2012); LEWIS HANKE, ALL
MANKIND IS ONE (1974).
428 INDIAN FREEDOM: THE CAUSE OF BARTOLOME DE LAS CASAS 203-04 (Francis Patrick Sullivan, S.J., trans.,
1995).
429 HANKE, supra note 433, at 96.
430 See Modern History Sourcebook: The Declaration ofSentiments, Seneca Falls Conference, 1848, FORDHAM
UNIV. (1997), http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/senecafalls. asp.
431 See, e.g., Frederick Douglass, The Meaning of The Fourth ofJuly for The Negro (1852), in FREDERICK
DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 188, 203 (Philip Foner & Yuval Taylor, eds., 1999).
432 See JOSEPH HAWLEY, Speech on the Chinese Exclusion Act, in RACE AND LIBERTY IN AMERICA: THE ESSENTIAL
READER 83 (Jonathan Bean, ed., 2009); Masuji Miyakawa, Rights ofAliens in America, in 1 N.Y. JAPAN REV. 91, 96
(1913).
433 See, e.g., John Ross et al., Indian Lands in Georgia, NILES WEEKLY REGISTER, May 1, 1824, at 139 ("We appeal
to the magnanimity of the American congress for justice and the protection of the rights, liberties and lives of the
Cherokee people . . . and we expect it from them under that memorable declaration 'that all mean are created
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principles as mere cultural prejudices-most notably the Dred Scott Court, which ruled that they
applied only to white men, not to all humanity.434
The United States repudiated that falsehood long ago. "The equality declared by our
fathers in 1776," said Charles Sumner in a courtroom argument challenging school segregation
in 1849,
was Equality before the Law. Its object was to efface all political or civil
distinctions, and to abolish all institutions founded upon birth .... Here is the
Great Charter of every human being drawing vital breath upon this soil, whatever
may be his condition, and whoever may be his parents. He may be poor, weak,
humble, or black,-he may be of Caucasian, Jewish, Indian, or Ethiopian race ...
but before the Constitution . . . all these distinctions disappear. He is not poor,
weak, humble, or black; nor is he Caucasian, Jew, Indian, or Ethiopian ... he is a
MAN, the equal of all his fellow men. 435
In vanquishing slavery and ratifying the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 436 the
United States renewed its commitment to the principle that all people are entitled to equal
treatment as individuals before the law-a principle Martin Luther King later called the
"promissory note" of the American Dream.437 It is simply not true that being citizens on a par
equal."'); "WILLIAM PENN" [JEREMIAH EVARTS], No. XXII, in ESSAYS ON THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE CONDITION
OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 89-90 (1829) ("[The Cherokee] are to be made outlaws on the land of their fathers ...
[under] a government which sprung into existence with the declaration 'that all men are created equal . . . ."').
434 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407-11 (1856). The Dred Scott Court claimed that "[n]o one supposed" at
the time of the Declaration of Independence, "that any Indian . .. was capable of enjoying, the privileges of an
American citizen," id. at 420, although it did observe that Indians -"altogether unlike" black Americans-could be
made citizens. Id. at 403-04. Still, it was "necessary, for their sake as well as our own, to regard [Indians] as in a
state of pupilage." Id. at 404.
435 Charles Sumner, Equality Before the Law (1849), in 3 CHARLES SUMNER: HIS COMPLETE WORKS 51, 65-66
(1900).
436 The Thirteenth Amendment directly applies to Indian tribes. Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 747 (D.C. Cir.
2008). Although the Fourteenth does not, see Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978), the Indian
Civil Rights Act forbids tribes from denying to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws
or due process of law. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2012).
437 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream (1963), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 217 (James M. Washington, ed.,1986).
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with others makes Indians "de facto whites." 438 What it makes them is frllow citizens-equal
participants in American democracy, whose rights the government must defend.
Incidentally, the idea that tribal membership is a function of genetics is also not original
to Indians. It is a legacy of racist doctrines introduced by whites in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, in contradiction of the Declaration's principle of equality. The very concept of generic
"Indian" was "an arbitrary collectivization" imposed by Europeans in disregard of the cultural
differences between aboriginal inhabitants of the Western hemisphere. 439 When the Dawes
Commission sought to compile authoritative lists of the native population, it categorized people
into tribes on the basis of biology, and affiliated each person with only a single tribe,
notwithstanding the long tradition of tribes accepting members from other tribes or even from
white society. 440 White anthropologists, in the grip of racist pseudo-scientific fads, also
employed phrenology and other quack methods to categorize Indians-and to impose significant
legal handicaps. 441 ICWA's use of such stereotypical language as "an Indian family" is a
throwback to the racialized concept of "generic Indian" that whites invented to serve a racist
agenda. 442 Those who assert that blood ancestry is sufficient justification for treating Indian
children differently, and reject both the best interests of the child test and the Existing Indian
438 CURRY, supra note 421, at 99.
439 ROBERT M. UTLEY, THE INDIAN FRONTIER, 1846-1890 at 4-6 (Allen Billington et al. eds., Univ. of N.M. Press
rev. ed. 2003) (1984).
440 Ray, supra note 40, at 408; ELLEN SAMUELS, FANTASIES OF IDENTIFICATION: DISABILITY, GENDER, RACE 161-85
(2014).
441 See, e.g., ORIN STERN, ISHI'S BRAIN: IN SEARCH OF AMERICA'S LAST "WILD" INDIAN 174, 174-86 (2004).
44 2 See further CHARLES C. GLENN, AMERICAN INDIAN/FIRST NATIONS SCHOOLING: FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO
THE PRESENT 196 (2011) ("Continuing to emphasize generic 'Indian' separateness detached from specific tribal
identities and cultures benefits the virtuosi of identity, those who make it their business to be accepted as ethnic
leaders or spokesmen . . .. [T]he demand for special treatment is often made not only on the basis of a deprived
condition but also on what is represented to be a racially based and significantly distinct mode of functioning that
only the racial virtuoso understands and can prescribe for. This has the effect of reviving the assumptions about
fundamental racial differences that have been so profoundly harmful to the education of Indian youth.").
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Family Doctrine for racialist reasons, have become "caught in the colonial feedback loop" that
uses "colonial mechanisms of power under the guise of self-determination." 443
By contrast, the idea that all people are fundamentally free and equal, with a right to be
treated as individuals, rather than as members of this or that ethnic category, is revolutionary
precisely because it is not situated within Anglo-American culture, or any particular culture at
all. It is true of all people everywhere. 444 As John Locke wrote, it is true even of "an Indian, in
the woods of America," because it applies "to men, as men, and not as members of society." 445
The propositions that a child should be treated as an individual, and that her best interests as a
child should be the overriding priority in a case involving her welfare, are rooted in the idea of
universal human rights-an idea to which oppressed peoples have too long been denied access,
and which is too precious to compromise in the service of collective tribal interests.
443 Chin, supra note 43, at 1267-68. Cf United States v. Bryant, 136 S.Ct. 1954, 1968-69 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("Until the Court ceases treating all Indian tribes as an undifferentiated mass, our case law will remain
bedeviled by amorphous and ahistorical assumptions about the scope of tribal sovereignty. And, until the Court
rejects the fiction that Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, our precedents will continue to be
based on the paternalistic theory that Congress must assume all-encompassing control over the 'remnants of a race'
for its own good.").
4 1 See Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Henry Pierce, Apr. 6, 1859, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 376
(Roy Basler, ed. 1953) (referring to Declaration of Independence's principle of equality as "an abstract truth,
applicable to all men and all times."). One testament to the universal applicability of these principles is the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims that "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights." U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg. at 72, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). The U.N.'s
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (which has not been ratified by the United States) specifies that
while "indigenous communities" have the "right" to "retain shared responsibility for the upbringing, training,
education, and well-being of their children," that right must be "consistent with the rights of the child."
U.N.ESCOR, Comm. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly, 3,E/CN.4/Sub.2 (1993) (emphasis added), http://staging.ilrc.vm-
host.net/sites/indianlaw.org/files/DRIPSen.pdf at 3. It also pronounces the right of "[i]ndigenous individuals,
particularly children," to "all levels and forms of education of the state without discrimination," requires states to
"take effective measures" to ensure "the rights and special needs of children.," and to "take specific measures to
protect indigenous children" from various types of dangers "to the child's health, or development." Id. art. XIV(2),
XXI(2), XVII(2) (emphasis added).
445 John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 14, in JOHN LOCKE: Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
318 (Peter Laslett, ed. 1963).
76 [Vol. 37:12017]
76
Children's Legal Rights Journal, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol37/iss1/2
Escaping The ICWA Penalty Box
Professor Christine Metteer has put the point in particularly striking terms. Quoting
novelist Barbara Kingsolver, she argues that an Indian child should be subjected to tribal
jurisdiction just like "a baby elephant [ought to] be raised by elephants." 446 But dividing human
beings along biological lines-regarding Indians as a different species, as pack animals that, like
elephants, must be raised by "their own kind"-is repugnant to a constitutional order that strives
to protect every person as an individual human being. The proposition that "it is per se in an
Indian child's best interest to remain with his or her family and/or tribe," 447 or that "the child
belongs to the tribe" 448 because of her genetics, or that "the best interests of Indian children" are
"necessarily dependent upon" the tribe's interests, 449 or that a child is a "tribal resource" if her
biology fits a certain profile-all these are obnoxious to American legal institutions. Our
nation's commitment to the constitutional rights of every citizen, including American Indian
children, cannot yield to Volksgemeinschaft reasoning-let alone tolerate ICWA's implicit
notion of Republikflucht.450 Even if it were true that "the Indian community focuses on the
collective rights of the community as a large cultural group and not on individual rights"451 a
generalization not supported by history452 -then the fact that Indian children are citizens of the
United States, whose rights are constitutionally guaranteed, must still take precedence.
446 Christine Metteer, Pigs in Heaven: A Parable ofNative American Adoption Under the Indian Child Welfare Act,
28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 624 (1996) (quoting KINGSOLVER, supra note 356).
447 Mall, Keeping it in The Family, supra note 51, at 165 (emphasis added).
448 Paul David Kouri, Note, In Re M.J.J., J.P.L., & J.P.G:.: The "Qualified Expert Witness" Requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 403, 415 (2005).
449 Brian D. Gallagher, Indian Child Welfare Act of 19 78: The Congressional Foray into the Adoption Process, 15
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 81, 105-06 (1994) (emphasis added).
450Republikflucht was the term applied by the East German government to the act of "deserting" the nationby
fleeing across the Berlin Wall. See PATRICK MAJOR, BEHIND THE BERLIN WALL: EAST GERMANY AND THE
FRONTIERS OF POWER ch. 3 (2010).
451 Debra Dumontier-Pierre, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Montana Analysis, 56 MONT. L. REV. 505,
523 (1995).
452 American Indian tribes have widely different cultures. Some, such as the Sioux and Cherokee, have long been
renowned for their strong individualism. See, e.g, Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where Does Economic
Development Really Come From? Constitutional Rule Among the Modern Sioux AndApache (Harvard Project on
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There is nothing ignorant or chauvinistic about saying so.453 Quite the contrary. It is
precisely because the idea of individual rights is the opposite of ignorance or chauvinism that it
has any meaning at all, and that peoples of vastly different cultures may justly claim it.454 On
this principle, the legal institutions of the United States must hold firm, as with a chain of
steel.455 To the extent that sovereignty-whether of a state or of a tribe-may conflict with
protections for the rights of individual children, that sovereignty must yield.456
None of this is to deny that Indians have suffered cruel wrongs at the hands of the federal
government. Nor is it to minimize the persistent problems of racism. Indeed, it is just because
we must regard Indians as individuals, and not as biologically beyond the pale of legal equality,
that we see racism, past and present, as wrong. And that is why it is imperative that our law
cease depriving Indian children of the protections available to children of other races. Nor is it to
deny that state courts applying the best-interest standard have sometimes wrongly incorporated
American Indian Economic Development, Apr. 1993) at 27,
http://t.hpaied.org/sites/default/files/publications/PRS93-7.pdf ("In fact, a high degree of individualism
characterized Sioux society."); ROYAL B. HASSRICK, THE Sioux: LIFE AND CUSTOMS OF A WARRIOR SOCIETY 31
(1964) (Sioux culture included an "individualism that could be daring to the point of recalcitrance."); Amy Sturgis,
Liberty in Perfection: Freedom in Native American Thought, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC., Sept. 1, 1999,
https://fee.org/articles/liberty-in-perfection-freedom-in-native-american-thought/ ("Native American culture and
politics revolved around the individual."). In others, that individualist tradition was radically undermined by the
Indian Reorganization Act and other federal policies that imposed a romanticized vision of collectivism on tribes.
See ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 140-46, 168-71. Today, Indian tribes continue to develop and implement legal
approaches to protect individual rights. See generally Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal
Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889 (2003).
453 Cf Ester C. Kim, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: The Contemplation ofAll, the Best Interests
ofNone, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 789 (1991) (noting how appeals to Indian cultural uniqueness often "serve[] as
an impenetrable shield" against criticism of ICWA because "[a]ny attack made on this 'unique' relationship by a
non-Indian can immediately be discounted without further discussion because of that person's non-Indian
ancestry.").
454 Those who view such principles as chauvinistic or racist commit the fallacy of the "stolen concept": the only
reason why racism is a wrong to be condemned is because it offends the principle of equality underlying the
Declaration. It is logically incoherent to denounce the proposition of universal human equality and at the same time
to embrace the idea that different legal standards should apply to people on the basis of race.
455 Cf Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Elihu Washburne, Dec. 13, 1860, in 4 BASLER, supra note 450, at 151.
456 Cf FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 192, at 309 (James Madison) (to the extent that sovereignty is irreconcilable
with individual rights, "the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter.").
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cultural biases into the analysis, 457 or that Indian children suffer by being removed from their
families, or that tribal cultures are worth preserving, or even that tribal courts should have
jurisdiction to adjudicate the child custody disputes of tribal members domiciled on reservations.
But it is to deny that "Indian children are different, an exemption requiring a separate
argument"458 on account of their genetic ancestry, or that children like Lexi-whose only
connection to an Indian tribe is biological-can or should be segregated when it comes to legal
proceedings that are supposed to protect them from abuse and find them permanent, caring
homes.
And it is to deny that the welfare of Indian children is none of non-Indians' business. As
Martin Luther King explained, "the interrelatedness of all communities and states" makes it
wrong to "sit idly by" while our fellow citizens are treated unjustly on account of their race.
"Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere," he wrote. "Anyone who lives inside the
United States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its bounds." 459 It should go
without saying, of course, that it is also ultimately in the best interests of Native Americans
themselves to prioritize the individual safety and well-being of Indian children, even over the
distinct interests of tribal governments. 460
CONCLUSION
457 See, e.g., Brokenleg v. Butts, 559 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
458 Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Wenona T. Siegel, Introduction, in FLETCHER, ET AL., supra note 51, at xiii.
459 Martin Luther King, Letter from Birmingham Jail (1963), in WASHINGTON, supra note 443, at 290.
460 Cf Michelle Zehnder, Who Should Protect the Native American Child: A Philosophical Debate Between the
Rights of the Individual Verses the Rights of the Indian Tribe, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 903, 949-50 (1996) ("If
child abuse continues unabated on reservations, the ability of tribes to achieve total independence could be
jeopardized .... Punishing those who abuse children will break the cycle of abuse, allowing Indian children to
grow up free of dysfunction and become strong tribal leaders.").
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The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed with good intentions: to stop abuses that broke
up Indian families and intruded on legitimate tribal government interests. But six of its
provisions-jurisdiction transfer, the "active efforts" requirement, the different standards of
evidence for foster care decisions and for terminating parental rights, and the preferences applied
to foster placement decisions and to adoption cases-place Indian children in a penalty box,
depriving them of critical constitutional protections. This applies even to children whose only
connection to a tribe is their biological ancestry. The resulting system of legal segregation
cannot be reconciled with this nation's commitments to federalism, equality, and due process of
law-or its commitment to the best interests of American Indian children.
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